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Anticompetitive Intent and Refusals to
Deal Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act*
THOMAS J. COLLIN**
A supplier's agreement not to deal with a competitor of one of its
customers can constitute a contract, combination, or conspiracy under
section I of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.1 It has become a virtual axiom of
antitrust law that a refusal to deal pursuant to such an agreement violates
section 1 when accompanied by either anticompetitive intent or effect, or
both.2 However, neither the text of section 1, the common law upon which
it stands, nor the Supreme Court decisions construing the section support
a conclusion that joint conduct of this type violates section 1 when
accompanied by anticompetitive intent alone. The conclusion that it does
is simply groundless. Why this is so is the subject of this article.
I. INTRODUCTION
Agreement by a single supplier not to deal with a competitor of a
customer (a "two-firm refusal") is a common commercial occurrence.
Every decision by a supplier to substitute one customer for another or to
maintain an existing customer while declining to sell to a prospective
customer potentially rests upon such an agreement. The supplier may be a
manufacturer or a distributor; the customer may be a distributor, dealer,
or any other person acting as an intermediary between purchasers of a
product and the product's source. Except when it is in furtherance of price-
fixing, however, such an agreement is notper se unlawful under section 1.
Instead, the legality is governed by what has become known as the rule of
reason.
4
This Article is limited to two-firm, nonprice refusals subject to
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1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (originally enacted as § I of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647,26 Stat.
209 (1890)) [hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Act]. Section 1, as amended, provides as follows.
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or With foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other
person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
2. See text accompanying notes 13-17 infra.
3. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977).
4. Any argument to the contrary was foreclosed by the Supreme Court in ContinentalT.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). There, in overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Court held that "nonprice vertical restrictions" are notperse illegal, but are to
be evaluated under the rule of reason. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18, 58-59. Both the Ninth and Second Circuits
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evaluation under the rule of reason. The rule of reason focuses attention on
the circumstances surrounding and resulting from joint conduct. Under
the rule, the legality of a contract, combination, or conspiracy udider
section 1 must be evaluated "by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business,
the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed."5 The
classic definition of the rule was announced in Board of Trade v. United
States (Chicago Board of Trade):6
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is
of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competitition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
have approved applications of this holding to a single-supplier, single-customer refusal, such as that
under consideration here. See Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-88 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130-34 (2d Cir.)(cn banc),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
In Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979), the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit suggested that a two-firm refusal that curtails intrabrand competition may be per se
illegal under the policy against horizontal restraints developed in United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), and other cases. After making several observations about what it thought
the law might be, the Cernuto court reasoned, however, that the per se rule was applicable to the
defendant's refusal to deal because the refusal was aimed at eliminating price competition, Id. at 165.
Moreover, the rule ofperse illegality would apply to ajoint vertical refusal if more than one firm at
either the supplier or customer level were a party to it, and the refusal was motivated by anticompetitive
intent. The refusal would then constitute a classic group boycott, or refusal to deal. See, e.g., Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d
1000, 1020-24 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. deniedsub nom. Western Internat'l Hotels Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973). Cf. Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 447 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978) (holding that sham bidding does not constitute aperseviolation), See also
cases cited in note 234 infra. A two-firm refusal, however, obviously lacks any concert among parties at
the same level.
Although there is a tenuous thread of cases, originating with Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell
Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S.522 (1932), that recognizes the
proposition that joint conduct carried out with an intent to eliminate a competitor is subject to theper
se rule, see, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F. 2d 547,560-62 (1st
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co., 353
F.2d 618,622 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966); cf. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. McKenzie
Tank Lines, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 639, 642-44 (N.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 594 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088, 1092-94 (N.D, Tex.
1976), the limited and declining judicial acceptance of the Pick-Barth doctrine, see, e.g., Northwest
Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 86-90 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1116 (1979); Stifel, Nicholaus & Co. v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 578 F.2d 1256, 1259-61 (8th
Cir. 1978), together with its virtual repudiation in the circuit of its origin, ::ee George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 560-62 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975), make this line of cases at best an aberration. These cases will, accordingly, not be discussed in
the following pages.
5. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). Under tle
per se rule, on the other hand, certain types ofjoint conduct are "conclusively presumed illegal without
further examination" of the surrounding circumstances. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1551 (1979).
6. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may
help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.7
Application of rule-of-reason analysis to a two-firm refusal has
almost uniformly led to the conclusion that the refusal is, subject to the
exceptions noted below, lawful under section 1. The refusal is not pro-
scribed, because it produces no restraint of trade or commerce, as H & B
Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co.,3 a typical distributor
termination case, illustrates. In that case, a former distributor of
bulldozer-loaders, backhoes, and hydraulic excavators manufactured by
International Harvester Company (IH) alleged that IH had conspired
with IH's local branch office to drive the distributor, H & B, out of
business. The complaint alleged that IH had, among other things, forced
H & B to terminate its distributorship arrangement with IH.9
At the close of H & B's case, the district court directed a verdict for
III. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that
H & B had failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy, to and that no
section 1 claim had been stated. On the merits of the section 1 claim, the
court held that H & B had totally failed to establish that the distributor-
ship termination was productive of anticompetitive effects. The termina-
tion had no impact on interbrand competition because it resulted only
in the substitution of an IH branch office (which was later sold to an
independent third party) for H & B." Furthermore, the termination
had no measurable impact on intrabrand competition since four other IH
distributors continued in business in the area even after the termina-
tion. 12
Two-firm refusals have, however, been held to violate section 1 under
certain circumstances. Those circumstances were recently summarized by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
[A] manufacturer generally may determine the method of distribution. A
manufacturer may terminate even a successful distributor and select another
distributor even if the arrangement was solicited by the second distributor.
The selection of one distributor or method of distribution violates §1 only if
thepurpose or effect is anticompetitive. Thus the action is illegal only if taken
expressly to drive the plaintiff out of business; or in an attempt to
7. Id. at 238.
8. 577 F. 2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).
9. Id. at 242.
10. Id. at 243-45.
11. Id. at 246.
12. Id. Cases holding that substitution of distributors or dealers causes no anticompetitive eflcct
and is therefore outside the reach of § 1 are legion. Representative decisions include Burdett Sound,
Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1975); Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp.,
461 F.2d 1093, 1094-95 (3d Cir. 1972); Ace Beer Distrib., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283,286-87 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d
418,420-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp.,
138 F. Supp. 899,904-07 (D: Md.), affld, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
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monopolize; or to fix prices; or to force the plaintiff to accept resale price
restrictions or territorial allocations; or to increase the manufacturer's
market dominance; or if the manufacturer engages in predatory prac-
tices.
13
Refusals that produce unreasonable restraints on intrabrand competition
without countervailing benefits to interbrand competitition must be added
to this list. 14
The focus of this Article is the conduct described by the italicized
language in the preceding quote: a two-firm, nonprice refusal in which
"the purpose .-. . is anticompetitive." It would be helpful, of course, to
know what the courts mean by "anticompetitive" purpose or intent, but
they have failed to define the phrase as it has been applied in rule-of-reason
cases.' 5 The absence of a definition has not, however, deterred the courts
from predicating decisions on a finding of such a purpose. For example, it
has recently been held that a contract, combination, or conspiracy, not
productive of any discernible restraint of trade, nonetheless violates
section 1 if accompanied by an intent to restrain trade.16 Moreover, there
are several cases in which it has been held, without attention to effect, that
the reasonableness, or lack of reasonableness, of a contract, combination,
or conspiracy turns on the presence or absence of anticompetitive intent.
1 7
The judiciary's failure to give content to "anticompetitive purpose"-
also variously referred to as "intent," "object," or "motive"'t$-constitutes
a tacit admission that a competitor's state of mind is, at best, a poor
criterion for the measurement of section 1 legality. This admission is well-
13. Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954, 961 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated on other
grounds by stipulation of the parties, 591 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
14. Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,54-56 (1977). For cases in which
the presence of additional distributors was relied upon to support a conclusion that a manufacturer's
termination of a single distributor caused no significant adverse effect on intrabrand competition, see H
& B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239,246 (5th Cir. 1978); Diehl & Sons, Inc, v.
International Harvester Co., 426 F. Supp. 110, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
15. Efforts have been made to look behind this phrase in decisions addressing the applicability of
the per se rule to group boycotts. It has been observed, for example, that a forbidden purpose is one
that aims at "exclusionary or coercive" conduct. E.g., E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air
Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Sum of
Squares, Inc. v. Market Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
16. See Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 446 F.Supp. 874, 880 (E.D. Wis. 1978), rev'd,
599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,48 U.S.L.W. 3253 (Oct. 16, 1979). Seealso discussion at notes 270-
73 and accompanying text infra.
17. See, e.g., Fount-Wip, Inc. v. Reddi-Wip, Inc., 568 F.2d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1978); Alpha
Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d 442,452 (9th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Magovern, 456 F.
Supp. 1000, 1005-06 (W.D. Pa. 1978). For a discussion of Fount- Wip, see text accompanying notes
239-51 infra.
18. "Intent," "purpose," "motive," and "object" differ subtly from each other in meaning. The
distinction between "intent" and "motive," for example, may have significance both in tort law, see,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 767, Comment d (1979), and criminal law, see, e.g., Cook, Act,
Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645,658-62 (1917). In applying these terms to
§ I, however, the courts have shown no concern about any differences in meaning; they have used the
terms interchangeably when referring to the defendant's state of mind. For convenience, an "evil" state
of mind will be referred to in this Article simply as "anticompetitive intent."
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founded, for there is simply no ground for making a party's state of mind
dispositive of legality under section 1. Instead, as Justice Brandeis
observed in the passage from Chicago Board of Trade quoted above, state
of mind is significant only to the extent that evidence of it assists in
evaluating the competitive effect of a restraint.' 9
The limited importance of anticompetitive intent in the context of a
two-firm refusal will be established in the following pages of this Article.
The Article will first review the text of section 1 and its legislative history. It
will then turn to a review of the common law doctrines upon which section
1 is based and which it has incorporated. The judicial origins of the fallacy
that anticompetitive intent alone can support a holding of section 1
illegality will then be reviewed. 20 Finally, the Article will discuss the
cases in which that fallacy has been rejected.
II. THE TEXT AND BACKGROUND OF SECTION 1
On July 2, 1890, President Benjamin Harrison signed what has
become known as the Sherman Act into law. Section I of that Act provides
in part as follows: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."21
This language (which has never been amended) does not, by its terms,
make a contract, combination, or conspiracy unlawful if accompanied
by anticompetitive intent alone.
Before undertaking a review of the legislative history, it should be
noted that section 1 has both criminal and civil dimensions. The second
sentence of section 1 provides that participation in a restraint of trade is a
misdemeanor.2 Section 7 of the Sherman Act,23 which was incorporated
into section 4 of the Clayton Act 24 in 1914, provided for the recovery of
treble damages by any person injured in his business or property by reason
of any conduct declared illegal by the Sherman Act and, after passage of
the Clayton Act, by the antitrust laws in general.2 Participation in conduct
19. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
20. Although this Article confines attention to vertical two-firm refusals, its conclusion that
anticompetitive intent alone is not a ground for § I liability has application to any case, such as, e.g.,
Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136,1151 (5th Cir. 1977), subject to rule-of-
reason scrutiny.
21. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § I
(1976)). See note I supra for the full text of section 1 as amended.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 was amended effective December 21, 1974. to make its
violation a felony. See Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974).
23. 26 Stat. at 210. For the text of § 7, see note 51 infra.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (original version at ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)).
25. Id. Section 4 provides in pertinent part as follows:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason ofanything forbidden
in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover'threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
proscribed by section 1 could thus expose a party to both criminal and civil
liability.
The Supreme Court recently affirmed, in United States v. United
States Gypsum Co.,26 the proposition that criminal intent must be proved
by the government in a prosecution under section 1. Faced with what it
viewed as the "minimal assistance" offered by the text of the Act and an
"unhelpful" legislative history,27 the Court surveyed "more general sources
and traditional understandings of the nature of the element of intent in the
criminal law.",28 Based upon its review of these sources, the Court
concluded that "action undertaken with knowledge of its probable
consequences, and having the requisite anticompetitive effects can be a
sufficient predicate for a finding of liability under the antitrust laws., 29 To
obtain a conviction, the government must therefore prove both
anticompetitive effect and an intent to produce the effect.
In the same opinion, the Court observed that it was leaving
unchanged "the general rule that a civil violation can be established by
proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.030 We
now turn to a consideration of whether this "general rule" in fact finds any
support in the legislative history of section 1 or the common law upon
which it stands.
A. Legislative Background of Section 1
Congress declared contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade or commerce unlawful in section 1. Focusing solely on
this language, early Supreme Court decisions construing the section held
that all restraints of interstate trade and commerce had been proscribed.3'
The Court arrived at this position, in part, by refusing to acknowledge the
debates and other congressional activity leading to passage of the Act.32
26. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
27. Id. at 443, 444.
28. Id. at 444.
29. Id. For an earlierformulation of the intent needed for conviction under § ],see United States
v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913): "[B]y purposely engaging in a conspiracy which necessarily and
directly produces the result which the statute is designed to prevent, [defendants] are, in legal
contemplation, chargeable with intending that result." The standard of intent approved in United
States Gypsum also applies in civil actions alleging monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); United States v,
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,431-32 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe Mach,
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953), affid, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam) ("Defendant
having willed the means, has willed the end").
30. 438 U.S. at 436 n.13. See note 270 infra regarding the Court's citation of authority for this
"general rule."
31. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274,297 (1908); Northern Sec. Co, v. United States, 193 U.S.
197,331 (1904); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505,559-62,573-78 (1898); United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312, 327-29 (1897). For a representative lower court
decision following this view of§ 1, see Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, 115 F. 610, 619,
622 (6th Cir. 1902).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,318 (1897) (debates
are not a proper source for determining meaning of language in the Act). "
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Although resort to the debates was initially eschewed, it was expressly
approved by the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States3 and later in
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.34 A short outline of the legislative history of
the Act is a necessary predicate to review of the relevant debates.3 5
1. Passage of the Act
At the outset of the first session of the 51st Congress, Senator
Sherman introduced the legislation which, in altered form, would become
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. His bill, designated S. 1,36 was substantially
the same as another bill, S. 3445, that he had introduced in the first session
of the 50th Congress some two years earlier.37 That bill had been debated
on the floor of the Senate in January and February of 1889 but no further
action was taken on it.
as
The Finance Committee, to which S. I had been committed, reported
out an amended version of the new bill on January 14, 1890.39 After
33. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. 310 U.S. 469,489, 493 n.15 (1940).
35. For details of the legislative history of the Act, see generally I E. KI ,TER, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 13-30 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
KINTNER]; H. THORELLI, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 164-232 (1955) [hereinafter cited as TIIORELLIj,
and Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Ci. L REv. 221 (1956).
36. The text of S. 1, as introduced, is as follows:
That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or
corporations made with a view or which tend to prevent full and free competition in the
importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported into the United States, or in the
production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth or production, or domestic
raw material that competes with any similar article upon which a duty is levied by the United
States, or which shall be transported from one State or Territory to another, and all
arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or
corporations designed or which tend to advance the cost to the consumer ofanysuch articles,
are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful, and void.
SEC. 2. That any person or corporation injured or damnified by such arrangement,
contract, agreement, trust, or combination may sue for and recover in any court of the United
States or competent jurisdiction, of any person or corporation a party to a combination
described in the first section of this act, the full consideration or sum paid by him for any
goods, wares, and merchandise included in or advanced in price by said combination.
SEC. 3. That all persons entering into any such arrangement, contract, agreement,
trust, or combination described in section I of this act, either on his own account or as agent
or attorney for another, or as an officer, agent, or stockholder of any corporation, or as a
trustee, committee, orin any capacity whatever, shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on
conviction thereof in any district or circuit court of the United States shall be subject to a fine
of not more than S10,000 or to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not more than
five years, orto bothsuch fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. And it shall be
the duty of the district attorney of the United States of the district in which such persons
reside to institute the proper proceedings to enforce the provisions of this act.
The text is reprinted at 21 CONG. REc. 2599 (1890) and in KINTNER, supra note 35, at 89-90
(punctuation differs between these two reprints; the above quotation follows the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD).
37. For the text of S. 3445, as introduced by Senator Sherman, see KiNTNE, supra note 35, at
63-64. The text of S. I (which is reproduced in note 36 supra) as introduced by SenatorSherman in the
51st Congress on December 4, 1889, is identical to the text of S. 3445 after it had been amended by the
Finance Committee and reported to the Senate on September 11, 1888. See KINTNER, SUpra note 35, at
64-65.
38. See THORELLI, supra note 35, at 171-73.
39. See THORELLI, supra note 35, at 177. The committee had added, among other things, a
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preliminary floor debate on February 27, 1890, the bill was sent back to the
committee. The Finance Committee reported out an amended version of
the bill on March 18, 1890, revised in response to certain objections that
had been raised in the debate of February 27.40 Floor debate on this version
of the bill began on March 21, 1890, and continued on March 24 through
March 27.
provision in § 2 for the doubling of damages. As reported out by the Finance Committee, the bill
provided as follows:
That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or
corporations made with the intention to prevent full and free competition in the importation,
transportation, or sale of articles imported into the United States, or in the production,
manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth or production, or domestic raw material
that competes with any similar article upon which a duty is levied by the United States, or
intended for and which shall be transported from one State or Territory to another for sale,
and all such arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons
or corporations intended to advance the cost to the consumer of any such articles arc hereby
declared to be against public policy, unlawful, and void.
SEC. 2. That any person or corporation injured or damnified by such arrangement,
contract, agreement, trust, or combination may sue for and recover, in any court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction, of any person or corporation a party to a
combination described in the first section of this act, twice the amount of the damages
sustained, and the costs of suit.
SEC. 3. That all persons entering into any such arrangement, contract, agreement,
trust, or combination described in section one of this act, either on his own account or as
agent or attorney for another, or as an officer, agent, or stockholder of any corporation, or as
a trustee, committee, or in any capacity whatever, shall be guilty of a high misdeameanor, and
on conviction thereof in any district or circuit court of the United States shall be subject to a
fine of not more that $10,000 or to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not more
than five years, or to both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. And it
shall be the duty of the district attorney of the United States of the district in which such
persons reside to institute the proper proceedings to enforce the provisions of this act.
The text is reprinted at 21 CONG. REC. 2599 (1890), and in KINTNER, supra note 35, at 93-94. The
italicized word "or" in § I appears in KINTNER but not the CONGRESSIONAl. RECORD (punctuation also
differs between these two reprints; the above text follows the punctuation in the CONoRESSIONAL
RECORD).
40. See THORELLI, supra note 35, at 179. As amended, S. I provided as follows:
That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between two or more
citizens or corporations, or both, of different States, or between two or more citizens or
corporations, or both, of the United States and foreign states, or citizens or corporations
thereof, made with a view or which tend to prevent full and free competition in the
importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported into the United States, or with a view
or which tend to prevent full and free competition in articles of growth, production, or
manufacture of any State or Territory of the United States with similar articles of the growth,
production, or manufacture of any other State orTerritory, or in the transportation or sale of
like articles, the production of any State or Territory of the United States into or within any
other State or Territory of the United States; and all arrangements, trusts, or combinations
between such citizens or corporations, made with a view or which tend to advance the cost to
the consumer of any such articles, are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful,
and void. And the circuit courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of all suits
of a civil nature at common law or in equity arising under this section, and to issue all
remedial process, orders, or writs proper and necessary to enforce its provisions. And the
Attorney General and the several district attorneys are hereby directed, in the name of the
United States, to commence and prosecute all such cases to final judgment and execution.
SEC.2. That any person or corporation injured or damnified by such arrangement,
contract, agreement, trust, or combination defined in the first section of this act may sue for
and recover, in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, without respect to
the amount involved, of any person or corporation a party to a combination described in the
first section of this act, twice the amount of damages sustained and the costs of the suit,
together with a reasonable attorney's fee.
21 CONG. REC. 2455 (1890).
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Numerous amendments, none of them relevant to the present inquiry,
were made by the Committee of the Whole on March 25 through March
27.4' Over strenuous objection, the bill was referred to the Judiciary
Committee on March 27 for consideration of what were thought by many
senators to be serious questions about the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause to enact the legislation.4 3 The Judiciary Committee
reported out an amended version of S. 1 on April 2, 1890,44 with a proposal
41. See THORELLI, supra note 35, at 191-98.
42. The view of Senator Vance of North Carolina was shared by many of those senators
opposing reference to the Judiciary Committee:
Mr. President, I never have a bill in which I feel anyinterest referred to this grand mausoleum
of Senatorial literature, the Judiciary Committee, without feeling that I have attended a
funeral. This occasion is no exception to that feeling. The grand air of magisterial dominion
which surrounds those gentlemen who constitute that committee, the awful profundity and
gravity with which they are enveloped, naturally tend to produce a funereal impression upon
a serious mind, and the whole atmosphere seems to me resonant with the strains of that
familiar old hymn:
Hark! from the tombs a doleful sound;
Mine ears attend the cry.
Come, living men, and view the ground
Where your bills must shortly lie.
[Laughter.]
I recollect very well when a bill was passed through this body forbidding the employment
of any Senator or Representative as counsel for any railroad which had been subsidized by
the Government. We all thought it was a mighty good bill and a mighty proper one, and so
thought the Senate; but a motion to reconsider was made. The question was discussed, and it
was finally proposed to refer it to theJudiciary Committee. On that occasion I bade my friend
farewell. I was promised, however, that it should come back. It did come back, but, alas, it did
not come back in the same body in which it went. It was Greece, but living Greece no more. It
came back mangled and mutilated until its parent knew it not and disclaimed its paternity.
[Laughter.]
Mr. President, I think if it were not so late in the evening and the Senate would give me its
patient attention that I could demonstrate the fact that if a man desired to go to any given
point he must start, and that he never would get there until after he did start, and my opinion
is that we never shall get a bill for the suppression of the trusts and combinations which
oppress a large portion of the American people so long as we consign all ofour bantlings to
the fostering care of the Judiciary Committee. I say it with all due respect to that great
committee, of course. I ama man too cautious of my personal safety to desireto doanything
that would bring upon me the enmity or the disregard of that august body. [Laughter.]
So, if it is the determination of the Senate to send this bill to the Judiciary Committee, to
deliver the child for nurture to the persons having most interest in its death, I shall have
sorrowfully to submit myself to that state of things, but I hope I may be pardoned for saying
that I feel a good deal as we are given to understand the Apostle Paul felt when he took leave
of the elders at Ephesus. Having told them that he should depart from them never more to
return, the record says:
They all wept sore and fell on Paul's neck, sorrowing most of all for the words
which he spake, that they should see his face no more.
I am satisfied, sir, that when this bill does come back it will be so mutilated, that it will
have everything that can possibly be of any benefit to the people of this country so entirely
eliminated and eradicated, that it will for practical purposes not be worth the paper that it is
written upon, and the country will so accept it. The country knows the receptacles where we
deposit our dead by this time. We can no longer hope to conceal them.
21 CONG. REc. 2610 (1890).
43. See, e.g., id. at 2607 (remarks of Senator Platt).
44. Id. at 2901. As reported from the committee, the bill provided in pertinent part as follows
SEC. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, orconspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such
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to amend S. 1 by substituting its version of the bill for everything after the
enacting clause. The Senate passed the committee's version of the bill,
without amendment, on April 8, 1890. 45
The House took up consideration of S. 1 on May 1, 1890, and passed
an amended version of the bill on the same date.46 Senate consideration of
the House version followed, and the bill was in turn submitted to a
conference committee. The conference committee's report was rejected by
the House on June 12, 1890.4' A second conference committee issued its
report on June 18, 1890, recommending that both houses retract their
amendments and enact S. I as originally passed by the Senate.48 The
Senate approved the report on the same day,49 and the House followed on
June 20, 1890.50 The bill was signed into law on July 2, 1890.51
combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
SEc. 4. The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with
jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several
district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the
Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations.
Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such
violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall
have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the
hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the
court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be
deemed just in the premises.
SEc.'7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person
or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may
sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee,
Id. at 3145.
45. Id. at 3153.
46. Id. at 4104. See THORELLI, supra note 35, at 202-06 for a description of the House debate.
The text of the debate appears at 21 CONG. Rac. 4088-101 (1890).
47. 21 CONG. REc. 5981-83 (1890). For an account of Senate consideration of the Houseversion
of S. 1, the deliberations of the first conference committee, and the votes on its report, see TIORILLI,
supra note 35, at 206-09.
48. The conference committee's report is reprinted at 21 CONG. Rac. 6208 (1890).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 6312-14.
51. The final version of the Act read as follows:
SEC. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such
combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
SEC. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or
by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
SEc. 3. Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of
ANTICOMPETITIVE INTENT
2. The Debates
The debates offer limited, but crucial, guidance on the role of intent in
determining civil liability for "restraint of trade." As will be seen, the
debates lead our attention to the common law doctrines applicable to joint
conduct affecting trade and commerce and establish that section I was to
draw its content from those doctrines.
As introduced by Senator Sherman, the first section of S. 1 contained
no direct reference to restraint of trade. Instead, it proscribed "all
arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations . . . made
with a view or which tend to prevent full and free competitition ...and
all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or com-
binations .. .designed or which tend to advance the cost [of articles] to
the consumer . . ,52 Even with this wording, however, the bill,
according to the senator, did "not announce a new principle of law, but
applie[d] old and well recognized principles of the common law to the
complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government. Similar
Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or
between any such Territory orTerritories and any State or States or the District of Columbia,
or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or
foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal Every person who shall make anysuch contract or
engage in anysuch combination orconspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
SEc. 4. The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested withjurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty oftheseveral
district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the
Attorney-General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations.
Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such
violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall
have been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the
hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the
court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be
deemed just in the premises.
SEc. 5. Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under
section four of this act may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties
should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to besummoned, whether they
reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be served
in any district by the marshal thereof.
SEc. 6. Any property owned underany contract orby any combination, or pursuant to
any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act, and being
in the course of transportation from one State to another, or to a foreign country, shall be
forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those
provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the
United States contrary to law.
SEC. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person
or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may
sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant
resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recoverthreefold
the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
SEc. 8. That the word "person," or"persons," wherever used in this act shall be deemed
to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the
United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any
foreign country.
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, cl. 647, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
52. See note 36 supra for the full text of the original version of S. 1.
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contracts in any State in the Union [were], by common or statute law, null
and void. 53
The role of a defendant's intent in civil proceedings under Senator
Sherman's version of the bill was addressed by the senator himself. In
discussing the provisions that would give federal courts jurisdiction to
grant injunctive relief at the instance of the Attorney General and creating
a private right of action for persons injured, the senator noted that:
[T]he intention of the combination is immaterial. The intention of a
corporation cannot be proven. If the natural effects of its acts are injurious, if
they tend to produce evil results, if their policy is denounced by the law as
against the common good, it may be restrained, be punished with a penalty or
with damages, and in a proper case it may be deprived of its corporate powers
and franchises. It is the tendency of a corporation, and not its intention, that
the courts can deal with. 4
Sherman found it necessary to address the question of intent because
the Finance Committee had initially amended S. I to condition liability on
the intent of the parties to a combination." Sherman urged that intent was
relevant only to section 3 of the bill, which provided criminal penalties for
the acts of individuals in furtherance of a combination declared unlawful
under section 1. Moreover, he proposed that the criminal feature of the bill
should be omitted:
Every corporation engaged in business must be responsible for the tendency
of its business, whether lawful or unlawful, but individuals can only be
punished for criminal intentions. To require the intentions of a corporation to
be proven is to impose an impossible condition and would defeat the object of
the law. To restrain and prevent the illegal tendency of a corporation is the
53. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890). Senator Sherman repeatedly urged that the bill was designed
only to give the federal courts jurisdiction over conduct already proscribed at common law:
It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and human experience, that
is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combination.
[A]1 I wish is to have the courts of the United States do by these greater combinations
what has been done already by the courts of the States.
Now, Mr. President, what is this bill? A remedial statute to enforce by civil process in the
courts of the United States the common law against monopolies.
As I said in my argument-and I do not want to repeat it over again-this bill is simply
an attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Slates, to declare unlawful
contracts which have been held unlawful in every state of the Union where the subject has
been brought before the courts; nothing more, nothing less.
Id. at 2457, 2458, 2461, 2563.
This view of this form of the bill was shared by Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, a senior member
of the Judiciary Committee and co-author with Senators Edmunds of Vermont and George of
Mississippi of the final version of the bill: "[Nothing is] prohibited in this bill which is not prohibited by
the general common law, as [Senator Platt of Connecticut] and I learned it in our studies, in regard to
such things as are covered by the English common law." Id. at 2729.
54. Id. at 2456.
55. The Committee's original amendments to S. 1, reported on January 18, 1890, added an intent
requirement. See note 39 supra. Sherman insisted in debate with Senator George that this amendment
had, in fact, not been adopted by the Committee. See 21 CoNG. REC. 2461 (1890) (remarks of Sen.
Sherman).
[Vol. 40:895
ANTICOMPETITIVE INTENT
proper duty of a court of equity. To punish the criminal intention of an officer
is a much more difficult process and might well be left to the future.56
Sherman believed the lack of any need to prove intent to be central to
the success of the civil remedies in the bill, since Senator George, the
leading opponent of Sherman's bill, had earlier insisted that the remedies
were unworkable because dependent upon proof of specific intent to
violate the law. 7 Sherman defended his version of the bill, as reported out
by the Finance Committee, as containing no such requirement. Under his
version, effect was crucial; intent wai not. As he phrased it: "The tendency
is the test of legality. The intention is the test of a crime."58
The Judiciary Committee's amendment of S. I abandoned any
reliance on either "tendency" or "intention." Without departing from
Senator Sherman's insistence that the bill was designed to give the federal
courts jurisdiction over conduct already proscribed at common law, the
committee dramatically simplified the text of section I to provide only that
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies "in restraint of trade or
commerce" would be illegal. The members of the committee offered no
specific explanation during debates for departure from Sherman's
formulation of section 1, but Senator Hoar characterized the committee's
general objective as follows: "We have affirmed the old doctrine of the
common law in regard to all interstate and international commercial
transactions, and have clothed the United States courts with authority to
enforce that doctrine by injunction. We have put in also a grave penalty."59
Senator Edmunds of Vermont, chairman of the Judiciary Committee
and author of substantially all of the amended version of section 1,60
concurred in Senator Hoar's view:
[T]he committee . . . thought that . . . we would frame a bill that should
be clearly within our constitutional power, that we should make its definition
out of terms that were well known to the law already, and would leave it to the
courts in the first instance to say how far they could carry it or its definitions as
applicable to each particular case as it might arise. 1
Senator Edmunds explained that his amendments to S. I were aimed
primarily at reducing Sherman's version of the bill, with the amendments it
had accumulated by the time it was referred to the Judiciary Committee, to
intelligible simplicity: "I should hope that the Senate of the United
States . . . would allow us to pass a bill that is clear in its terms, is definite
in its definitions, and is broad in its comprehension, without winding it up
into infinite details ... ,,2
56. 21 CoNG. Rac. 2457 (1890).
57. Senator George's remarks appear at 21 COwG. REc. 1765-67 (1890).
58. Id. at 2461.
59. Id. at 3146.
60. See Letwin, supra note 35, at 254.
61. 21 CONG. REc. 3148 (1890).
62. Id.
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Senator Hoar confirmed, in discussing the meaning of "monopolize"
in section 2 of the amended bill, that the terms of S. 1, as amended, were to
draw their content from the common law:
"[M]onopoly" is a technical term known to the common law[;] . . . the
word "monopoly" is a merely technical term which has a clear and legal
signification ....
...The common law in the States of the Union of course extends
over citizens and subjects over which the State itself has jurisdiction ....
[W]e find the United States without any common law. The great thing that
this bill does ...is to extend the common-law principles, which protected
fair competition in trade in old times in England, to international and inter-
state commerce in the United States.
63
With this legislative background in mind, we now turn to a review of
the common law of restraints of trade as it existed at the time the Act was
adopted.
B. The Common Law and the Content of Section 1
Section 1 of S. 1, standing, as the chairman of the Judiciary
Committee had observed, on terms "well known to the law already,"64 was
enacted as section 1 of the Sherman Act. Although section I applies to an
infinite variety of factual situations, the legal content of the section is well-
defined. Its meaning is sharply delimited by the common law meanings of
"contract, combination, or conspiracy" in "restraint oftrade" at the time of
the passage of the Act.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the applicability of the common
law definitions to section 1 in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.65 Writing
for the majority, Justice White, who in previous decisions had vigorously
dissented from the Court's literal reading of the section,6 concluded that
"restraint of trade" must be given its common law meaning6 7 and taken to
signify only "undue" restraints. 68 He summarized this holding later in the
same term in United States v. American Tobacco Co.,6V a case decided only
two weeks after the Standard Oil decision:
Applying the rule of reason to the construction of the statute, it was held in
the Standard Oil Case that as the words "restraint of trade" at common law
and in the law of this country at the time of the adoption of the Anti-trust Act
only embraced acts 'or contracts or agreements or combinations which
operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting
63. Id. at 3152.
64. Id. at 3148 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
65. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,344-46 (1897) (White,
J., dissenting).
67. 221 U.S. at 50-59.
68. Id. at 59-60.
69. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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competitition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which, either
because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of
the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, that the words as used in the statute
were designed to have and did have but a like significance. 70
This principle of statutory construction was most effectively
summarized by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Charles D.
Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp.,71 a 1952 decision that construed a
provision of the Lanham Act:72 "[W]hen the legislature borrows such
words [words with an established common law meaning], they are deemed
to retain their previous meaning unless there is a contrary legislative
intention clearly expressed in the statute or its history."73 Justice White
approved application of the principle to section I of the Sherman Act in
the Standard Oil case:
Let us consider the language of the first and second sections [of the Act],
guided by the principle that where words are employed in a statute which had
at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country
they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels
to the contrary.
74
Thus, to determine whether there is a violation of section I whenjoint
conduct is accompanied solely by anticompetitive intent, one must inquire
into the state of the common law at the time the Sherman Act was adopted.
If that conduct was void, actionable, or unlawful under the common law, it
is necessarily unlawful under section 1. If, on the other hand, the joint
conduct was not void, actionable, or unlawful at common law, it is not
unlawful under section 1.
Two separate and distinct common-law doctrines underlie the
operative language of section 1: (1) contracts in restraint of trade and (2)
conspiracies in restraint of trade. In reformulating section 1 to include
"terms that were well known to the law already,"75 the Judiciary
Committee trimmed and altered the "arrangements, contracts,
agreements, trusts, or combinations 76 language of Senator Sherman's
version of section 1, leaving only contracts, combinations, and con-
70. Id. at 179.
71. 194 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1952) (construing in dicta a provision ofthe Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1052-1127 (1976)). Accord, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 353 (1897)
(White, J., dissenting); Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434,446 (1889); Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc. v. City
of Chicago, 122 F.2d 132, 135-36 (7th Cir. 1941), revd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
72. The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946, ch. 540.60 Stat. 427, provided procedures to registerand
protect trademarks.
73. 194 F.2d at 421.
74. 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) (footnote omitted). See also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rsv.
United States, 435 U.S. 679,688 (1978) ("The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress]
expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law
tradition"); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,494-500(1940); United States v.Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 58 F. 58, 67 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd on other grounds, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
75. 21 CONG. REc. 3148 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
76. See note 36 supra for the text of S. I as introduced by Senator Sherman on December 4
1889.
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spiracies. Contracts and conspiracies in restraint of trade were common-
law concepts with specific meanings; combinations were a species of the
former, new to the law, but equally well understood.
1. Contracts in Restraint of Trade
The meaning of "contracts in restraint of trade" was fully discussed by
the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber," a case
decided on the eve of passage of the Sherman Act and one that is
representative of common law decisions on the topic of contracts in
restraint of trade. In that case, defendant Roeber was sued by the Diamond
Match Company (Diamond) to enforce a covenant in which Roeber had
agreed (in connection with the sale in 1880 of the assets and stock of his
New York City friction match manufacturing firm to Swift & Courtney &
Beecher Company (Swift)) not to engage directly or indirectly in the
manufacture or sale of friction matches anywhere in the United States
(except Nevada and Montana) for a period of ninety-nine years."8
Contemporaneously with the execution of the covenant, Roeber had
executed a $15,000 bond in favor of Swift as liquidated damages in the
event of his breach of the covenant.79
Diamond, the assignee of Swift's rights under the purchase
agreement,80 employed Roeber in 1881 and 1882.81 Roeber then left
Diamond and went to work for a competing firm headquartered in New
Jersey. 2 Diamond sued to enforce the covenant, and Roeber defended on
the ground that it was void and unenforceable because it constituted a
restraint of trade.
8 3
The court began by reviewing the English origins of the doctrine that
contracts in general (as opposed to partial) restraint of trade are void, The
court then noted that the doctrine was no longer followed, but that instead,
the governing test of the enforceability of contracts in restraint of trade was
one of reasonableness:
The tendency of recent adjudications is marked in the direction of relaxing
the rigor of the doctrine that all contracts in general restraint of trade are
void, irrespective of special circumstances. Indeed, it has of late been denied
that a hard and fast rule of that kind has ever been the law of England
(Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 L. R., Ch. Div. 351). The law has, for centuries,
permitted contracts in partial restraint of trade, when reasonable; and in
Homer v. Graves (7 Bing. 735), Chief Justice TINDAL considered a true test to
be "whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the
77. 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
78. Id. at 477-78, 13 N.E. at 419.
79. Id. at 479, 13 N.E. at 420.
80. Diamond had purchased theassets of Swift in 1881. Id. at478, 13 N.E. at420. Foran account
)f the fortunes of the Diamond Match Company and its efforts to monopolize the friction match
lusiness, see Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 43 N.W. 1102 (1889).
81. 106 N.Y. at 479, 13 N.E. at 420.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 479-80, 13 N.E. at 420.
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interests of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to
interfere with the interests of the public." When the restraint is general, but at
the same time is co-extensive only with the interest to be protected, and with
the benefit meant to be conferred, there seems to be no reason why, as
between the parties, the contract is not as reasonable as when the interest is
partial, and there is a corresponding partial restraintfr.
The court concluded that the covenant in question created only a partial
restraint of trade and was reasonable:
The covenant in the present case is partial, and not general. It is practically
unlimited as to time, but this, under the authorities, is not an objection, if the
contract is otherwise good. (Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & W. 548; Muniford v.
Gething, 7 C. B. [N.S.] 305, 317.) It is limited as to space since it excepts the
State of Nevada and the Territory of Montana from its operation, and
therefore is a partial and not a general, restraint. . . .The defendant entered
into the covenant as a consideration in part of the purchase of his property by
the Swift & Courtney & Beecher Company, presumably because he
considered it for his advantage to make the sale. He realized a large sum in
money, and on the completion of the transaction became interested as a
stockholder in the very business which he had sold. We are of opinion that the
covenant, being supported by a good consideration, and constituting a partial
and not a general restraint, and being, in view of the circumstances disclosed,
reasonable, is valid and not void.85
Was intent to be taken into account in determining whether a contract
was void and unenforceable because in unreasonable restraint of trade?
The only decision of which this author is aware that directly addresses the
question is Diamond Match Co. The opinion in that case, however, does
not detail the circumstances under which defendant raised the contention
that Diamond had sought to enforce the covenant in furtherance of an
intent to restrain competition. It may nevertheless safely be assumed that
defendant had urged that Diamond was attempting to monopolize the
friction match business and, in furtherance of this design, had sought to
eliminate defendant as a competitor.86 The court rejected the effort to
prove intent or motive:
We are not aware of any rule of law which makes the motive of the covenantee
the test of the validity of such a contract. On the contrary we suppose a party
may legally purchase the trade and business of another for the very purpose of
preventing competition, and the validity of the contract, if supported by a
consideration, will depend upon its reasonableness as between the parties!
7
84. Id. at 481-82, 13 N.E. at 421.
85. Id. at 484-86, 13 N.E. at 423. For other decisions recognizing the tests of enforceability
approved in Diamond Match Co., see, e.g., Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889); Santa
Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387, 18 P. 391 (1888); Central Ohio Salt Co. v.
Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666,671-73 (1880); Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 E. & B.47 (Q.B. 1855), aff'd, 6 E. & B. 66
(Ex. 1856). On the status of the doctrine of contracts in restraint of trade on the eve of passage of the
Sherman Act, see generally United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,279-83 (6th Cir.
1898), af'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 F. 58,68-73 (8th
Cir. 1893), rev'd on other grounds, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
86. See note 80 supra.
87. 106 N.Y. at 483, 13 N.E. at 422.
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Thus, intent and motive were not determinative of whether a contract
was void as an unreasonable restraint of trade. Reasonableness was
measured by the restraint that resulted from a contract without reference
to the state of mind of the parties. Anticompetitive intent alone was not
sufficient to void a contract.
Typically, judicial consideration of contracts in restraint of trade
arose in connection with restraints ancillary to an employment agreement
or to an agreement for the sale of a business.3 By comparison,
consideration of combinations in restraint of trade, a variety of these
contracts, often arose in connection with agreements among competitors
aimed at raising prices, dividing territories, or otherwise eliminating
competition. The state courts had had many opportunities to evaluate the
legality of these combinations by the time the Sherman Act was adopted.
People v. North River Sugar Refining Co.,89 an intermediate New
York appellate court decision, characterized as a "leading case" by Senator
Sherman during debate on his version of S. 1,90 is representative of these
decisions. In that case, the State of New York brought an action for the
dissolution of the North River Sugar Refining Company (North River), a
firm engaged in the operation of sugar refineries in New York. The state
argued that the corporation had ceased to exercise its statutorily ordained
functions when it became a party to an agreement with other refinery
companies under which each refinery surrendered its management
authority and agreed to forward all earnings to an umbrella association,92
the Sugar Refineries Company (Company). North River and other firms
executed the contract on August 16, 1887. 9' By the time of trial in 1888, a
total of seventeen firms had joined the Company, "leaving in the United
States certainly no more than six other companies or firms engaged in this
business. ' '94 At the close of the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for
the state on the ground that "an unlawful combination had been entered
into by the defendant and these other companies to control the production
and sale of sugar in the country." 95
In affirming the judgment of dissolution, the General Term of the
Supreme Court held that North River had improperly abandoned
management decisions to the Company96 and entered into an agreement
88. See, e.g., the cases cited in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,279-83 (6th
Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), and in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 F. 58,
68-73 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd on other grounds, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
89. 61 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 354, 7 N.Y.S. 406 (1889).
90. 21 CONG. REc. 2459 (1890).
91. 61 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 372-74, 7 N.Y.S. at 410.
92. Id. at 358-62, 372-73, 7 N.Y.S. at 407-08, 410.
93. Id. at 362, 7 N.Y.S. at 408.
94. Id. at 363, 7 N.Y.S. at 408.
95. Id. at 375, 7 N.Y.S. at 410.
96. Id. at 372-73, 7 N.Y.S. at 410.
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that was directed at an unlawful objective. The court described the object
of the agreement and its legality in the following terms:
A jury, certainly, would be fully justified in concluding, from the agreement
and the other facts in evidence in the case, that the governing object of the
association was to promote its interests and advance the prosperity of the
associates, by limiting the supply, when that could properly be done, and
advancing the prices of the products produced by the companies. To conclude
otherwise would be to violate all the observations and experiences of practical
life. This is a controlling feature in this controversy. And that it was intended
to be secured by the organization provided for, and which actually took place,
is reasonably free from doubt. And where that appears to be the fact, the
agreement, association, combination or arrangement, or whatever else it may
be called, having for its objects the removal of competitition and the
advancement of prices of necessaries of life, is subject to the condemnation of
the law, by which it is denounced as a criminal enterprise. 98
The court concluded that a combination of the type entered into byNorth
River was criminal, basing its decision on a New York statute that made a
conspiracy of two or more persons "to commit any act injurious . . to
trade or commerce" a misdemeanor.99
The court also observed that decisions of the courts of other states
supported a conclusion that the combination was void under the common
law.'00 Typical of the decisions cited was India Bagging Ass'n v. B. Kock &
Co., 10' a Louisiana case that dealt with "an agreement . . . between
several commercial firms for three months not to sell India cotton bagging
without the consent of the maj ority." 0 2 The North River court emphasized
that "[t]he [Louisiana] court in its decision, held that 'the agreement
between the parties was palpably and unequivocally a combination in
restraint of trade, and to enhance the price in the market of an article of
primary necessity to cotton planters.' ,,103 From this the New York court
distilled the principle that an agreement is illegal if it constitutes a
combination among producers of necessities through which the supply of
those necessities is curtailed and their prices to consumers artificially
elevated.
10 4
97. Id. at 384, 7 N.Y.S. at 414.
98. Id. at 379-80, 7 N.Y.S. at 411.
99. The statute is quoted in part in North River, 61 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 380,7 N.Y.S. at 411. An
earlier version of the statute was applied in Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173,184-
89 (1871); Clancey v. Onondaga Fine Salt Mfg. Co., 62 Barb. 395,403-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862); Hooker
& Woodward v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349, 352-54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
100. 61 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 380-82, 7 N.Y.S. at 412-13.
101. 14 La. Ann. 168 (1859).
102. 61 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 381,7 N.Y.S. at412, quoting India Bagging Ass'n v. B. Kock&Co., 14
La. Ann. 168, 169 (1859).
103. Id.
104. 61 N.Y. Sup. Ct. at 383,7 N.Y.S. at 413. For othercases dealingwith the common lawof
combinations in restraint of trade, see, e.g., Richardsonv. Buhl,77 Mich. 632,658,43 N.W. 1102,1110
(1889); Arnotv. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558,565-67 (1877); Craftv. McConoughy,79 111.
346, 350-51 (1875).
1979]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
As has already been noted, 0 5 intent was not determinative of the
enforceability of a contract in restraint of trade. If it is accepted, as the
cases reflect and as the Judiciary Committee recognized, that a
combination in restraint of trade was a distinct legal phenomenon, of what
significance was the intent of the parties to the combination in determining
its enforceability at common law?'
06
Intent is not addressed in the cases on combinations. The
preponderance of cases decided prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act
arose out of combinations of producers or suppliers that had already
succeeded in monopolizing a given commodity. As the California Supreme
Court's decision in Santa Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Hayes'
0 7
demonstrates, motive and intent under these circumstances were legally
inconsequential, for the resulting restraint of trade was manifestly
unreasonable, regardless of why it had been brought about by the
participants!0 8
In Santa Clara Valley, plaintiff, the owner of four sawmills in the
region of Felton, California, entered into agreements in 1881 with all other
sawmill owners in the area
to form a combination among all the manufacturers of lumber at or near
Felton, for the sole purpose of increasing the price of lumber, limiting the
amount to be manufactured, and giving plaintiff the control of all lumber
manufactured near Felton for the year 1881, and control of the supply of
lumber for that year in [a four-county area surrounding Felton].109
The combination also had the effect of eliminating the wholesale market
for lumber at Felton and sharply curtailing the supply of lumber available
to dealers.Y0 Defendants, two owners of mills in competition with
plaintiff's, were parties to the combination. They had agreed to
manufacture only a limited amount of lumber and to sell all of it to plaintiff
at $11 per thousand feet."' They also agreed to pay plaintiff $20 per
thousand board feet for any lumber sold to anyone in the four-county area
other than plaintiff." 2 When defendants failed to abide by this agreement,
plaintiff brought an action to recover damages. Defendants urged that the
agreement was void and unenforceable because it was a combination that
unreasonably restrained trade.
105. See text accompanying notes 86, 87 supra.
106. As the succeeding discussion ofconspiracy law will emphasize, contracts and combinations
in restraint of trade were not indictable offenses (except in a state, such as New York, with special
statutory provisions) and created no cause of action in third parties who might be injured as a result of
the restraint. They simply rendered the underlying agreement unenforceable between the parties. See
text accompanying notes 115-58 infra.
107. 76 Cal. 387, 18 P. 391 (1888).
108. Decisions under § 2 of the Sherman Act share the recognition that, once monopolization is
obtained and anticompetitive effect is consummated, the only issue remaining is whether the
monopolist arrived at market dominance consciously. See note 29 supra and note 291 infra.
109. 76 Cal. at 389, 18 P. at 392.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 388-89, 18 P. at391.
112. Id. at 389, 18 P. at 391.
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The Supreme Court of California did not analyze the intent of the
parties, because the restraint effected by the combination had un-
mistakably injured the public. It concluded that the agreement was
unenforceable: "[Plaintiff] entered into a contract with the object and view
to suppress the supply and enhance the price of lumber in four counties of
the state. The contract was void as being against public policy, and the
defendants, as they had a right to do, repudiated the contract."'
1 3
In this and similar cases the courts thus found it unnecessary to
determine whether the intent to restrain trade would by itself convert an
otherwise reasonable combination into an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Since, however, combinations in restraint of trade are a type of contract in
restraint of trade, the logic of Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber would
naturally apply:1 14 anticompetitive intent would not alone make a restraint
unreasonable.
2. Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade
A contract in restraint of trade was void and unenforceable, and
created no cause of action on the part of third parties injured by acts done
pursuant to that contract. A conspiracy in restraint of trade, however, was
actionable at the instance of injured third parties under limited
circumstances. In addition, a conspiracy was a criminal offense by statute
in New York and by common law in certain other jurisdictions.1 "
By the date of passage of the Sherman Act, conspiracy was well-
113. Id. at 392, 18 P. at 393. In so holding, the court relied heavily upon Arnot v. Pittston &
Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877), a case in which plaintiffs assignor and defendant had combined
to control the entire supply of anthracite coal in western New York. The Arnot court held that the
plaintiff's assignor, The Butler Colliery Company, could not recover the price of coal delivered
pursuant to the combination from defendant, a competitor thatwas also engaged in thedistribution of
coal in western New York. The court reasoned that the agreement was void and unenforceable:
The defendant . . . endeavored by this agreement to keep all of the coal of that company
out of the market, except the limited amount which it agreed to take, and thus to artificially
enhance the price of that necessary commodity. This purpose A-as the basis of the whole
agreement, and, as is found by the referee, was understood by both parties at the time of
entering into the contract.
That a combination to effect such a purpose is inimical to the interests of the public, and
that all contracts designed to effect such an end are contrary to public policy, and therefore
illegal, is too well settled by adjudicated cases to be questioned at this day.
Every producer or vendor of coal or other commodity has the right to use all legitimate
efforts to obtain the best price for the article in which he deals. But when he endeavors to
artifically enhance prices by suppressing or keeping out of market the products of others, and
to accomplish that purpose by means of contracts binding them to withhold their supply,
such arrangements are even more mischievous than combinations not to sell underan agreed
price. Combinations of that character have been held to be against public policy and illegal. If
they should be sustained, the prices of articles of pure necessity, such as coal, flour and other
indispensable commodities, might be artificially raised to a ruinous extent far exceeding any
naturally resulting from the proportion between supply and demand. No illustration of the
mischief of such contracts is perhaps more apt than a monopoly of anthracite coal, the region
of the production of which is known to be limited. Parties entering into contracts of this
description must depend upon each other for their execution, and cannot derive any
assistance from the courts.
Id. at 565-66 (citations ommitted).
114. See text accompanying notes 77-R8 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 120-22 infra.
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defined at common law.'1 6 Lord Coleridge summarized the law of
conspiracy as it applied to joint activity affecting commercial affairs in the
English case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.:' t1
If the combination is unlawful, then the parties to it commit a misdemeanour,
and are offenders against the State; and if, as the result of such unlawful
combination and misdemeanour, a private person receives a private injury,
that gives such person a right of private action.
It is, therefore, no doubt necessary to consider the object of the
combination as well as the means employed to effect the object, in order to
determine the legality or illegality of the combination. And in this case it is
clear that if the object were unlawful, or if the object were lawful but the
means employed to effect it were unlawful, and if there were a combination
either to effect the unlawful object or to use the unlawful means, then the
combination was unlawful, then those who formed it were misdemeanants,
and a person injured by their misdemeanour has an action in respect of his
injury. 18
This summary was the generally accepted formulation of the law of
conspiracy as it pertained to restraints of trade.'1 9
There were also criminal statutes governing conspiracies in restraint
of trade. Prior to 1890, for example, a New York statute made it a
misdemeanor to conspire "to commit any act injurious to trade or
commerce." 120 The application of this statute was consistent with the
common-law principles under which the enforceability of contracts in
restraint of trade was evaluated,12 ' and it appears that application of the
statute was confined to cases in which enforceability was the principal
issue.122 Its application casts no light on the law of conspiracies in restraint
of trade and will not be reviewed here. For illumination of the law of
conspiracies in restraint of trade other sources must be consulted.
Bowen v. Matheson123 is illustrative of the operation of common-law
conspiracy doctrines as applied to restraints of trade. In Bowen, plaintiff, a
116. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of conspiracy from the ancient writ of
conspiracy, see generally State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 333-59 (Md. 1821); Savile v. Roberts, 91
Eng. Rep. 1147, 1149-51 (1737).
117. 21 Q.B.D. 544 (1888), aff'd, 23 Q.B.D. 598 (C.A. 1889), aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25 (1891),
118. 21 Q.B.D. at 549-50. During early debate on S. 1, Senator George defined conspiracy as"a
combination or agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful
manner." 21 CONG. REC. 1771 (1890).
119. See text accompanying notes 123-58 infra.
120. 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 691, § 8, quoted in Hooker& Woodward v. Vandcwater, 4 Denlo 349,352
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
121. See Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 184-88 (1871) (applying a New
York statute); Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434, 441-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848).
122. See Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); Hooker & Woodward v,
Vandewater, 4 Denio 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847); Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173
(1871) (applying a New York statute). See also Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558,565
(1876) (citing Stanton, Hooker & Woodward and Morris Run Coal Co.). Cf. People v. North River
Sugar Refining Co., 61 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 354, 380-84, 7 N.Y.S. 406,411-13 (1889) (statute discussed in
connection with proceeding to dissolve corporation); Clancey v. Onondaga Fine Salt Mfg. Co., 62
Barb. 395, 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862) (comparable statute governing manufacture and sale of salt).
123. 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 499 (1867).
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shipping master engaged in the business of providing seamen for
employment, alleged that his competitors had conspired to force him out
of business. 124 Specifically, he asserted that defendants had, among other
things, attempted to prevent any of their seamen from shipping in any
vessel in which a member of the crew was not provided by a member of
defendant's association. Plaintiff alleged that this had been done in order
to maintain a uniform wage rate for the seamen employed by the
defendants.
21
In ruling on the case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
noted that the action stated a claim only if the defendants had committed
"illegal acts" against plaintiff. The court also observed that the allegation
that the acts were done pursuant to a conspiracy added nothing to
plaintiff's claim for relief.' 2 After considering each of the acts complained
of and the constitution and by-laws of the Association, the court sustained
a demurrer to the complaint:
We can see nothing criminal in any of these stipulations; . . . and nothing
illegal. If their effect is to destroy the business of shippingmasters who are not
members of the association, it is such a result as in the competition of business
often follows from a course of proceeding that the law permits. New
inventions and new methods of transacting business often destroy the
business of those who adhere to old methods. Sometimes associations break
down the business of individuals, and sometimes an individual is able to
destroy the business of associated men. It would be nothing novel if the
plaintiff in the exercise of his ingenuity should in his turn adopt some
improvement that shall compel the defendants to dissolve their connection.
As the declaration set forth no illegal acts on the part of the defendants, the
demurrer must be sustained.
27
In reaching this conclusion, the Massachusetts court followed its
earlier ruling in Commonwealth v. Hunt,28 in which Chief Justice Shaw
reviewed the law of conspiracy in connection with a criminal charge
against bootmakers who had agreed not to work for any manufacturer that
employed a bootmaker who was not a member of their association. The
third count of the indictment in Hunt had charged that defendants had
conspired with "wicked and unlawful intent" to drive a competitor,
Jeremiah Home, out of business. 129 Chief Justice Shaw, who had earlier in
the opinion defined conspiracy as "a combination of two or more persons
[who], by some concerted action, [seek] to accomplish some criminal or
unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself criminal or
unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means . . .,,130 held that the count
124. Id. at 500-01.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 502.
127. Id. at 503-04.
128. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
129. Id. at 133.
130. Id. at 123.
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was insufficient because the object, competition, was not unlawful and the
indictment did not charge any unlawful means by which that object was to
be accomplished:
We think, therefore, that associations may be entered into, the object of
which is to adopt measures that may have a tendency to impoverish another,
that is, to diminish his gains and profits, and yet so far from being criminal or
unlawful,, the object may be highly meritorious and public spirited. The
legality of such an association will therefore depend upon the means to be
used for its accomplishment. If it is to be carried into effect by fair or
honorable and lawful means, it is, to say the least, innocent; if by falsehood or
force, it may be stamped with the character of conspiracy. It follows as a
necessary consequence, that if criminal and indictable, it is so by reason of the
criminal means iitended to be employed for its accomplishment; and as a
further legal consequence, that as the criminality will depend on the means,
those means must be stated in the indictment.'
The Hunt case did not specifically discuss the significance of the
actors' intent in a conspiracy, nor did it indicate whether a conspiracy in
restraint of trade would be unlawful if it had no unlawful object and was
not to be carried out by unlawful means, but its participants were
motivated by anticompetitive intent. The Minnesota Supreme Court,
however, had occasion to address these questions in a case decided shortly
after passage of the Sherman Act. Relying upon precedents contem-
poraneous with and antecedent to the Act's enactment, that court held, in
Bohn Manufacturing Co. v. Hollis,132 that the presence of such intent had
no significance.
Plaintiff in Bohn Manufacturing was a manufacturer and vendor of
lumber and other building materials, and sold its products at both
wholesale and retail in Minnesota and adjoining states. 3 Defendants were
an association of retail lumber dealers and its secretary. 34 Plaintiff, in
common with certain other manufacturers and wholesalers, supported the
association and committed himself in principle to deal only with
retailers.135 When the secretary of the association discovered that plaintiff
had on two occasions sold lumber directly to contractors or consumers, the
association demanded that plaintiff pay over ten percent of the amount of
the sales. 136 Plaintiff balked, and the secretary indicated that, unless the
payment was made, he would, pursuant to a formal publication procedure,
notify the retail members of the association of the plaintiff's betrayal.
137
Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the secretary from acting, alleging that
publication of the notice would result in the refusal of the association's
131. Id. at 134.
132. 54 Minn. 223, 55 N.W. 1119 (1893).
133. Id. at 230, 55 N.W. at 1119.
134. Id. at 224, 55 N.W. at 1119.
135. Id. at 230, 55 N.W. at 1120.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 230-31, 55 N.W. at 1120.
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retail members to deal with it, causing it, in turn, to lose revenue and
profits. The trial court granted the injunction. 38 Defendants appealed, and
the Minnesota Supreme Court dissolved the injunction and reversed.
At trial and on appeal, plaintiff asserted that the members of the
association had engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade designed to drive
it out of business. 39 The court observed that the intent of the members of
the association was immaterial:
If an act be lawful,-one that the party has a legal right to do,-the fact that
he may be actuated by an improper'motive does not render it unlawful. As •
said in one case, "the exercise by one man of a legal right cannot be a legal
wrong to another", or, as expressed in another case, "malicious motives make
a bad case worse, but they cannot make that wrong which, in its own essence,
is lawful." Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225; Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N.Y. 39;
Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. St. 308.40
Thus, if a restraint of trade had been caused by a conspiracy among
businessmen, the conspiracy was not unlawful or actionable, even if the
participants intended to curtail competition, unless the object of the
conspiracy or the means used to achieve that object were unlawful. Other
cases clearly establish that the intent to curtail competition was not an
unlawful object.
The role of intent was carefully reviewed in Mogul Steamship Co. v.
McGregor, Gow, & Co.,' 4' an English case. In that case, plaintiffs were a
group of shipowners who operated the steamships Sikh, Afghan, Pathan,
and Ghazee between Australia and England, stopping at China en route.
42
Defendants, a group of rival shipowners who ran tea-bearing ships
between China and England, had formed among themselves a "con-
ference" pursuant to which they paid a five percent rebate to all exporters,
based principally at the ports of Shanghai and Hankow, who shipped their
tea exclusively on the defendants' vessels. 43 The conference was formed in
1884, and plaintiffs were initially admitted as members. 144 They were
excluded in 1885 and brought an action for damages.
45
Lord Coleridge, the trial judge in the Queen's Bench Division,
characterized the allegations of the complaint as follows: "[T]he
defendants unlawfully combined or conspired to prevent the plaintiffs
from canrying on their trade, that they did prevent them by the use of
unlawful means in furtherance of such unlawful combination or
conspiracy, and that from such unlawful combination or conspiracy
138. Id. at 231, 55 N.W. at 1120.
139. Id. at 225, 229, 231-32, 55 N.W. at 1120-21.
140. Id. at 233, 55 N.W. at 1121.
141. 21Q.B.D.544(1888),affld,23Q.B.D.598(C.A. 1889),aff'd, [1892]A.C.25 (1891). See text
accompanying notes 11718 supra.
142. 21 Q.B.D. at 544-45, 547.
143. Id. at 547.
144. Id. at 545.
145. Id. at 547.
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therefore damage has resulted to the plaintiffs." '146 In the course of
reviewing the plaintiffs contentions, Lord Coleridge addressed intent. 147
Plaintiffs had urged that the defendants had intended to conspire to ruin
them. The court agreed that'a "wrongful and malicious combination to
ruin a man in his trade may be ground for such an action as this,"'48 but
concluded that the facts showed no malicious intent:
The line is in words difficult to draw, but I cannot see that these defendants
have in fact passed the line which separates the reasonable and legitimate
selfishness of traders from wrong and malice. In 1884 they admitted the
plaintiffs to their conference; in 1885 they excluded them, and they were
detenined no doubt, if they could, to make the exclusion complete and
effective, not from any personal malice or ill will to the plaintiffs as
individuals, but because they were determined, if they could, to keep the trade
to themselves; and if they permitted persons in the position of the plaintiffs to
come in and share it they thought, and honestly and, as it turns out, correctly
thought, that for a time at least there would be an end of their gains.1
49
The Court of Appeal affirmed this conclusion. 50 Some of the
observations of the members of the court bear directly upon whether an
intent to curtail competition could convertjoint action in restraint of trade
into an actionable or unlawful conspiracy. Judge Bowen noted that an
intention to prevail over one's trade rivals falls far short of the evil motive
needed for a conspiracy:
[T]here was here no personal intention to do any other or greater harm to the
plaintiffs than such as was necessarily involved in the desire to attract to the
defendants' ships the entire tea freights of the ports, a portion of which would
otherwise have fallen to the plaintiffs' share. I can find no authority for the
doctrine that such a commercial motive deprives of "just cause or excuse" acts
done in the course of trade which would but for such a motive be justifiable.
So to hold would be to convert into an illegal motive the instinct of self-
advancement and self-protection, which is the very incentive to all trade. To
say that a man is to trade freely, but that he is to stop short at any act which is
calculated to harm other tradesmen, and which is designed to attract business
to his own shop, would be a strange and impossible counsel of perfection.' 5 '
Judge Fry concurred in the view that an intent to prevail over trade
rivals was not an unlawful object which would make a conspiracy
actionable:
These are, so far as I am aware, all the relevant authorities, and none of them
appears to me to support the proposition that mere competition of one set of
men against another man carried on for the purpose of gain and not out of
actual malice is actionable, even though intended to drive the rival in trade
146. Id. at 548.
147. Id. at 552-53.
148. Id. at 553.
149. Id. at 554.
150. 23 Q.B.D. 598 (C.A. 1889).
151. Id. at 614-15.
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away from his place of business, and though that intention be actually carried
into effect.
152
The House of Lords in turn affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Appeal. 153 The opinions of the members of the House of Lords deserve
attention not only because they thoroughly discuss the role of motive in
such a conspiracy, but also because, as Justice White noted in the Standard
Oil Co. case, they "serve . . . reflexly to show the exact state of the law in
England at the time the [Sherman] Antitrust statute was enacted."'5
Lord Halsbury found no unlawful object, that is, a malicious
intention to injure plaintiffs, on the part of defendants:
And, upon a review of the facts, it is impossible to suggest any malicious
intention to injure rival traders, except in the sense that in proportion as one
withdraws trade that other people might get, you, to that extent, injure a
person's trade when you appropriate the trade to yourself. If such an injury,
and the motive of its infliction, is examined and tested, upon principle, and
can be truly asserted to be a malicious motive within the meaning of the law
that prohibits malicious injury to other people, all competition must be
malicious and consequently unlawful, a sufficient reductio ad absurdum to
dispose of that head of suggested unlawfulness.155
This view was shared by Lord Hannen, who distinguished an intent to
injure plaintiffs from an intent, on the part of defendants, to promote their
own commercial position:
In considering the question, however, of what was the motive of the
combination, whether it was for the purpose of injuring others, or merely in
order to benefit those combining, the fact of several agreeing to a common
course of action may be important. There are some forms of injury which can
only be effected by the combination of many. Thus, if several persons agree
not to deal at all with a particular individual, as this could not, under ordinary
circumstances, benefit the persons so agreeing, it might well lead to the
conclusion that their real object was to injure the individual. But it appears to
me that, in the present case, there is nothing indicating an intention to injure
the plaintiffs, except in so far as such injury would be the result of the
defendants obtaining for themselves the benefits of the carrying trade, by
giving better terms to customers than their rivals, the plaintiffs, were willing
to offer. 156
While the English courts' denial of relief in Mogul Steamship may
seem harsh, the result was mandated by the doctrine that a third party
could not challenge an unreasonable restraint of trade unless it was carried
out pursuant to a conspiracy that caused the party special injury. 157
152. Id. at 632.
153. [1892] A.C. 25 (1891).
154. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56 (1911).
155. [1892] A.C. at 36-37.
156. Id. at 60.
157. As Judge Taft observed, certain members of the House of Lords had ventured the view that
the agreement forming the conference was a contract that unreasonably restrained trade. United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 286 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). As such, it
would fall within the reach of § 1.
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Competitive injury fell far short of the proof necessary to establish an
actionable or unlawful conspiracy, which required instead proof of an
unlawful object or of the accomplishment of a lawful object by unlawful
means. In order to prove an unlawful object, it was necessary to
demonstrate a malicious intent aimed at the ruin of a rival, and not merely
an intent to enhance one's competitive position. 58
3. Summary of the State of the Common Law
In short, at common law, intent did not enter into the determination
of whether a contract or combination was an unreasonable restraint of
trade. Correspondingly, an action for conspiracy could not be predicated
upon a party's intention to secure competitive advantages and prevail over
trade rivals. A conspiracy action required proof of unlawful means or an
unlawful object, not an intention to improve one's competitive position.
The common-law doctrines applicable to joint commercial activity
were, therefore, already highly developed by the time the Sherman Act was
adopted. As embodied in section 1, they produce these clear-cut results:
A restraint is unlawful under section 1 of the Act if it has the requisite
impact on interstate commerce and is the product of a contract,
combination, or conspiracy that unreasonably restrains trade, as defined
at common law prior to passage of the Act. Conversely, joint conduct is
not unlawful under section 1, even if it has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce, if it is not a contract, combination, or conspiracy that
unreasonably restrains trade, as defined at common law on the eve of
passage of the Act.
Given this framework, we now turn to a consideration of the cases
that apply section 1 to two-firm refusals to deal, and to a determination
whether the courts have correctly understood the limited significance of
intent under section 1.
III. APPLICATION OF SECTION 1 TO REFUSALS TO DEAL
Decades passed before the courts were called upon to apply section 1
158. Accord, Macauley Bros. v. Tierney, 19 R.I. 255, 33 A. 1, 4 (1895); Plant v. Woods, 176
Mass. 492, 501-02, 57 N.E. 1011, 1014 (1900) ("The primary object of the defendants was to build up
their own business, and this they might lawfully do to the extent disclosed . . . , even to the injury of
their rivals.").
It was announced in Commonwealth ex rel. Chew v. Carlisle, Brightly's Report 36 (Pa. Nisi Prius
1821), a case in which the legality of a combination of master shoemakers to regulate wages of their
employees was at issue, that "the motive for combining, or, what is the same thing, the nature of the
object to be attained as a consequence of the lawful acts is, in this class of cases [i.e., a conspiracy to do a
lawful act by lawful means], the discriminative circumstance." Id. at 39. This statement was deemed in
later Pennsylvania decisions to mean that a combination to do a lawful act by lawful means could
nonetheless constitute a conspiracy when undertaken with a motive "to oppress." Morris Run Coal
Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 187 (1871). See also Commonwealth v. Tack, 1 Brewst, 511,513,
517 (C.P. Pa. f868). The second part of this conclusion is correct; the first is not. As Lord Coleridge
observed in Mogul S.S. Co., acts undertaken with a malicious motive seeking the ruin of a competitor
may serve as the predicate for a conspiracy action because their object, i.e., the infliction of malicious
injury, is unlawful. 21 Q.B.D. at 549-50. To speak, however, ofjoint conduct with a lawful object but an
unlawful motive, as the Pennsylvania decisions do, is to create a contradiction, since a malicious
motive in legal contemplation is the same as an unlawful object.
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to a two-firm refusal to deal, that is, a refusal pursuant to agreement be-
tween a single supplier and single customer. Although concerted refusals
to deal pursuant to agreement between suppliers' 5 or customers 60 had en-
gaged the attention of the courts quite early, dealer substitutions,
terminations, and other conduct now integral to many manufacturers'
distribution systems were typically challenged by disappointed customers,
if at all, under common law contract principles that governed the
validity and termination of agency and distributorship arrangements.161
A brief look at one such case will demonstrate how these principles
were applied without regard to section 1.
In Bach v. Friden Calculating Machine Co.'62 plaintiff alleged that
defendant Friden, a manufacturer of calculating machines, had wrongfully
terminated its dealership agreement with the partnership (Bach) owned by
the plaintiffs. Friden had appointed Bach in 1935 to purchase and resell its
machines in the Cincinnati area.163 In 1942, however, Friden decided to
convert the appointment to an agency and reduce the commissions paid
Bach. 164 It sent Bach a "Sales Agent's Agreement" in 1944 for signature,
but plaintiffs refused to sign it.' 65 Friden thereupon advised them that the
distributorship would be terminated as of June 15, 1944.166 Friden
appointed a new distributor, Gunderson, who informed plaintiffs that he
would replace them. 1
67
Bach brought a diversity action against Friden and Gunderson
seeking to obtain an injunction against the termination. They apparently
urged that their appointment was to "continue during their lifetime, or at
least during such time as they continued to devote their best efforts to the
promotion and sale of the Friden calculator."' 68 The district court entered
judgment for defendants on the grounds, among others, that the
distributorship contract was unenforceable for want of consideration and
lack of mutuality and, in any event, was terminable at the will of either
party.
169
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It first held that
the contract rested on adequate consideration and was not void for lack of
mutuality. 70 It then ruled that the contract was not terminable at will, but
159. See, e.g., United States v. New England Fish Exch., 258 F. 732 (D. Mass. 1919).
160. See, e.g., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600,614
(1914); Ballard Oil Terminal Corp. v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 28 F.2d 91, 97-99 (lst Cir. 1928).
161. For representative annotations collecting pertinent cases and addressing the availability of
equitable relief in the case of threatened termination, see Annot., 145 A.LR. 684 (1943), and Annot.,
125 A.L.R. 1446 (1940).
162. 155 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1946).
163. Id. at 363.
164. Id. at 364.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 365.
169. Id. at 364.
170. Id. at 364-65.
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rather could be terminated only upon reasonable notice, and went on to
hold that the reasonableness of the notice that had been given was a
question of fact for the trial court to determine. 171 The court found it
unnecessary, however, to decide whether the contract was in fact to have
continued in effect for the period asserted by Bach since it concluded that
injunctive relief would not be available under any circumstances. The
court reasoned that the continued judicial supervision necessary for an
effective injunction would be impractical. 172 It affirmed the dismissal with
leave for plaintiffs to pursue any legal remedies they might have for breach
of contract. 17
3
By the 1930s litigants in cases with facts comparable to those of Bach
had begun to invoke section 1. One of the first reported cases along these
lines is Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp. 74 Plaintiff (Arthur) had been
the sole Baltimore distributor of mayonnaise and one of several
distributors of cheese manufactured by Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.
(Kraft).175 As of January 11, 1934, Kraft ceased selling to plaintiff at a
distributors' discount, 76 and plaintiff brought suit, alleging that this
termination was part of a conspiracy among Kraft, certain of its
employees, and a competing cheese distributor, Carpel.177 Specifically,
Arthur alleged that Kraft had conspired
" ...to force the plaintiff out of the plaintiff's lucrative business in the
defendant's said cheese and mayonnaise products if the plaintiff should
refuse to buy out said Carpel's business at and for a consideration of $10,000,
or refuse to sell his said business in the defendant's said products to the said
Carpel for the sum of $15,000"; and on the plaintiff's refusal to so either buy
or sell, the defendant thereafter refused to sell to the plaintiff the defendant's
products at a dealer's discount.
78
The district court held that the complaint failed to state a violation of
the federal antitrust laws. The court reasoned that "[e]ssentially what is
complained of is a private wrong or common law tort in which the public
interest is not involved,', 179 and held that the allegation of conspiracy
between Kraft and Carpel added nothing to the complaint. 8 ° It reached
this conclusion even though Arthur alleged that the refusal was arbitrary
and "without reasonable justification or excuse":81
In fact, taking all the averments of the declaration together there is really
171. Id. at 365.
172. Id. at 366.
173. Id.
174. 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1937).
175. Id. at 827.
176. Id. at 825, 827.
177. Id. at -827.
178. Id. (emphasis in original).
179. Id. at 828.
180. Id. at 829-30.
181. id. at 825.
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nothing to indicate that the defendant's refusal to further sell the plaintiffat a
discount resulted otherwise than from "its right to select its own customers
and was not in restraint of trade". Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 452 . . . .And even though, as the declaration
alleges, this right was exercised arbitrarily and unreasonably by the
defendant, nevertheless it does notjustify a suit under Section 15 [Section4 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)] unless the effect of the refusal was to
substantially lessen competition and was in restraint of trade.'82
There is no need to detail the cases subsequently decided which
reached the same result on comparable facts.1 3 Instead, our attention can
more profitably be directed toward a later decision that accurately
reflected the state of the law as of 1963, Ace Beer Distributors, Inc. v.
Kohn, Inc.184 In that case, plaintiff, Ace Beer Distributors, Inc. (Ace Beer),
alleged that it and its predecessor had been the exclusive distributor of
Stroh beer in Mahoning and Youngstown counties in Ohio since 1936.15
Defendant Stroh Brewery Company (Stroh) was the sole source of supply
for Ace Beer, which acted as a distributor only for Stroh.186 Ace Beer
alleged that Stroh and its codefendants had "maliciously conspired to
destroy plaintiff's business and to eliminate plaintiff as a beer distributor in
interstate commerce."' 18 7 Specifically, it asserted that Stroh had secretly
reached agreement with The Kohn Beverage Company, an existing
Youngstown, Ohio, business, under which Kohn would form a new
company, Kohn, Inc., that would be made the sole Stroh distributor in the
area served by Ace Beer.' 88 As part of the agreement, Stroh would cancel
Ace Beer's franchise. '89 Kohn, Inc., obtained a permit to distribute the beer
from the Ohio Department of Liquor Control on April 17, 1959. Stroh
cancelled Ace Beer's franchise on April 20, and appointed Kohn, Inc., in its
place.'90 Pursuant to a second prearranged agreement, the key employees
of Ace Beer departed en masse and joined Kohn, Inc. 1'
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
under section 1. The district court granted the motion, 92 and the Court of
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d418,420-21 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331,334-35
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953); Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519,522 (10th
Cir. 1950); Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37,43-44 (W.D. La. 1957)(dictum); Schwing Motor
Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 903-07 (D. Md.),aff'd, 239 F.2d 176(4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387, 398-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd by equally divided Court, 321 U.S. 707, 719 (1944).
184. 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
185. Id. at 285.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 285-86.
191. Id. at 286.
192. Id. at 284.
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals characterized
the complaint as follows:
In essence, the complaint charges that the defendants conspired to destroy
plaintiff's business and to eliminate it as a beer distributor in interstate
commerce and that this result was accomplished by the termination by Stroh
of plaintiff's franchise as its beer distributor and thereafter conducting its
business through another distributor.' 93
Despite Ace Beer's allegations of "malicious" conspiracy to destroy its
business, the court focused on the effect of the refusal to deal. It concluded
that the refusal, as alleged, had no effect on competition, and therefore was
not actionable under section 1:
The fact that a refusal to deal with a particular buyer without more, may have
an adverse effect upon the buyer's business does not make the refusal to deal a
violation of the Sherman Act. Damage alone does not constitute liability
under the Act.
The present case does not involve price fixing. Nor does it involve an
attempt to create a monopoly. The Stroh Brewery Company had one
distributor in the territory under consideration before it terminated the
plaintiff's franchise. It continued to have only one distributor thereafter,
There is no allegation or contention that the beer of other breweries was not
just as available in that area after the change in distributors as it was before.
See: United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 76 S. Ct.
944, 100 L. Ed. 1264.
Unless it can be said that the refusal to deal with plaintiff had the result of
suppressing competition and thus constituted "restraint of trade" within the
meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, there is no violation of the Act, We
do not think that the substitution by Stroh Brewery Company of one
distributor for another had this result.
. . . The substitution of one distributor for another in a competitive
market of the kind herein involved does not eliminate or materially diminish
the existing competition of distributors of other beers, is not an unusual
business procedure, and, in our opinion, is not an unreasonable restraint of
trade. 9
4
Other courts adopted the Sixth Circuit's analysis,"' and it was
apparently understood that the intent behind a conspiracy between a
supplier and a customer to eliminate another customer was, at the most,
relevant only insofar as it assisted in evaluation of the effect of the
conspiracy. 96 The test of illegality under the rule of reason was, as the
Supreme Court had early observed in Chicago .Board of Trade,97
193. Id. at 286.
194. Id. at 287.
195. See, e.g., Ricchetti v. Meister Brau, Inc., 431 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1970); Scanlan v,
Anheuser-Buseh, Inc., 388 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 916 (1968); Walker Distrib.
Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1963).
196. See text accompanying notes 7, 19 supra.
197. The court noted in Kohn that a manufacturer could select its customers and refuse to sell to
others "for reasons sufficient to itself." 318 F.2d at 286. Following Kohn, the district court in Aaron &,
Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co.,429 F. Supp. 1039,1047 (E.D. Mich. 1976), stated that "the reason
for refusal to deal is immaterial, provided it did not unreasonably restrain trade."
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anticompetitive effect. However, intent soon acquired far greater impor-
tance.
Beginning with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford
Dealers Advertising Association,198 the "anticompetitive reasons," if any,
of a supplier became a criterion employed by some courts to evaluate the
legality of a two-firm refusal to deal. In Cartrade, it was alleged by plaintiff,
a firm that acted as an information clearinghouse on the inventories of all
Ford dealers who were members of the defendant Ford Dealers
Advertising Association of Southern California (FDAA), that FDAA had
conspired with Ford Motor Company to terminate its relationship and
substitute another cartrader for it.199
Cartrade's contract was with FDAA, a corporation that had
appointed it in 1965 to act as the exclusive cartrader for all its members. '0
Ford sent Cartrade an IBM print-out that contained information on all
vehicles shipped to each dealer in FDAA, and it was thus able to monitor
the inventories of the dealers with minimum effort.201 Ford ceased making
IBM lists available to Cartrade in February 1966 and thereafter sent them
directly to FDAA for disposition.0 2 FDAA advised Cartrade it was
terminating its contract at the end of February 1966.203 As of March 1,
1966, FDAA obtained its cartrading information exclusively from a new
firm, Dealers Trade, to whom it made available Ford's IBM lists.
204
At the close of plaintiff's case, the district court directed a verdict in
favor of defendants. 2 5 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
on two grounds. It held, as the Sixth Circuit had in Ace Beer, that the
substitution of Dealers Trade for Cartrade had no effect on competition
and was, therefore, outside the reach of section 1.706 Unlike the Sixth
Circuit, however, it went on to inquire whether the substitution was
undertaken for "anticompetitive reasons.' 207 Only after finding none did it
hold that the claim was not actionable under section 1.208
The court's inquiry into the reasons for a refusal to deal constituted a
departure from the prevailing analysis of the legality of two-firm refusals
under section 1. While such an inquiry is clearly proper, as the Supreme
Court had noted in Chicago Board of Trade,209 the inquiry in Cart rade was
198. 446 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1971).
199. Id. at 290-92.
200. Id. at 291.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 292.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 290.
206. Id. at 293-94.
207. Id. at 294.
208. Id.
209. 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918). Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting S)stem, Inc.,
47 U.S.L.W. 4359, 4364 (U.S. April 17, 1979) (purpose may be considered to the extent it "tends to
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
undertaken for reasons different than those previously recognized. In
Chicago Board of Trade the Supreme Court had held that inquiry into the
intent of the parties would be relevant only because knowledge of intent
may assist a court in evaluating the effect of a restraint, In contrast, the
court's inquiry in Cartrade rested on the assumption that evidence of
anticompetitive reason or motive would by itself support a holding of
illegality, irrespective of the presence of any adverse effect on competition.
This assumption, previously unarticulated in the cases addressing two-firm
refusals and without a basis in the common law upon which the Sherman
Act stands, originated in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke
& Liquors, Ltd.210 and certain Supreme Court dicta.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that Hawaiian Oke did not arise
from a two-firm conspiracy. The conspiracy at issue in that case was
among competing suppliers and a prospective customer, with the goal of
replacing an existing, common customer of the suppliers.211 As the
following discussion will show, recognition of the distinction between a
two-firm vertical conspiracy and the tripartite conspiracy under review in
Hawaiian Oke is crucial for a proper analysis of the case and its proper
application as precedent. In situations such as that confronting the court in
Hawaiian Oke, the intent of the actors determines whether the tripartite
conspiracy isper se illegal or is instead subject to evaluation under the rule
of reason. Intent in a vertical two-firm conspiracy, on the other hand, is
simply a datum to be taken into account in evaluating anticompetitive
effect under the rule of reason.
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., (Hawaiian Oke) was the sole
distributor in Hawaii of certain alcoholic beverages produced by Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. (Seagram).1 2 It was also the sole Hawaiian
distributor of certain alcoholic beverages produced by Barton Distilling
Company (Barton).1 a Other products of Seagram and Barton were
distributed in Hawaii by McKesson & Robbins, Inc., (McKesson), a
competitor of Hawaiian Oke.21 4
show effect"). The Supreme Court's approval of consideration of evidence of purpose or intent is
consistent with the common law authorities discussed in the text accompanying notes 77-158 supra.
Under the common-law decisions addressing the reasonableness of contiacts and combinations in
restraint of trade, the crucial inquiry was whether the restraint was productive of injury to competition,
Review of evidence of purpose or intent was not foreclosed, but purpose or intent was not dispositive of
the reasonableness of the restraint. See Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419
(1887), discussed in the text accompanying notes 77-87 supra.
Under the common-law decisions addressing whether an action for conspiracy in restraint of tradc
could be maintained, evidence of purpose or intent had the same limited significance. Even ifan intent
to achieve an unlawful object, i.e., the destruction of plaintiff's business, was alleged, the dispositive
issue was whether there was an unlawful object, not whether there was anticompetitive intent. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 134 (1842), and Bohn Mfg., Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn.
223, 233, 55 N.W. 1119, 1121 (1893), discussed in the text accompanying notes 128.40 supra.
210. 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
211. See text accompanying notes 213-21 infra.
212. 416 F.2d at 73.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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In May 1965 one of Seagram's officers approached McKesson's vice-
president with a proposal that McKesson take over Seagram's "Calvert"
line, which, at that time, was distributed by Hawaiian Oke.21 5 At a later
date, Seagram proposed that McKesson also take over the "Four Roses"
and "Frankfort" lines, then handled by Hawaiian Oke.21 6 With these offers
in mind, McKesson approached Barton and suggested that it become the
Hawaiian distributor for Barton's products handled by Hawaiian Oke.
217
Barton agreed to McKesson's proposal, and McKesson, in turn, accepted
Seagram's.2 8
Seagram, through its separate "Calvert," "Four Roses," and
"Frankfort" divisions, advised Hawaiian Oke in late June and early July
1965 that it would not renew its distributorship agreements. 219 Barton
advised Hawaiian Oke in early July that it too was terminating its
agreement and transferring its lines to McKesson effective August 31,
1965.22 o
Hawaiian Oke sued for damages under sections I and 2 of the
Sherman Act, alleging that the terminations constituted a conspiracy
among Seagram, Barton, and McKesson. Plaintiff dropped the section 2
claim before trial and pursued the case on its section I claims only.221 The
jury returned a verdict for plaintiff after receiving liability instructions
later described by the court of appeals as follows: "The essence of these
instructions is that any agreement between two or more suppliers who have
been selling to or through distributor A to transfer their business to
distributor B, who is also a party to the agreement, is aper se violation of
section 1.,,222
Assuming that such a conspiracy was in fact supported by the
record,223 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding,
inter alia, that the instructions were erroneous and that there was
inadequate support in the record for the verdict.224 The court of appeals
directed its attention225 to whether the agreement was per se illegal under
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,226 and comparable cases
holding that group boycotts areper se violations of section 1. After noting
that "it is well settled that it is not aperse violation of the antitrust laws for
215. Id.
216. Id. at 73-74.
217. Id. at 73.
218. Id. at 73-74.
219. Id. at 74.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 72.
222. Id. at 75-76.
223. Id. at 7475.
224. Id. at 80.
225. The court addressed other issues on appeal as well, including intra-corporate conspiracy,
id. at 80-84, conscious parallelism, id. at 8485, and damages, id. at 85-89.
226. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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a manufacturer or supplier to agree with a distributor to give him an
exclusive franchise, even if this means cutting off another distributor,
2 7
the court turned to consider whether the case before it fell outside this
principle and was instead subject to theper se boycott rule because of the
presence of an agreement between horizontal competitors, Seagram and
Barton.
The court held that the case was not subject to the boycott rule.2 ' It
rested its conclusion on the ground that, in all cases in which a horizontal
agreement among competitors was held to be aper se violation of section 1,
"there was a purpose either to exclude a person or group from the market,
or to accomplish some other anticompetitive objective, or both. 229 In the
case before it, however, "plaintiff presented no evidence whatever that
either Seagram or Barton had any anticompetitive motive for terminating
plaintiff as their distributor., 230 Although acknowledging that under
certain circumstances, not present in the case, an agreement to establish a
common distributor could be shown to be an unreasonable restraint of
trade,23' the court held that the group boycott rule of per se illegality was
simply inapplicable.232
The court's analysis in Hawaiian Oke, therefore, did not focus on
assessing the legality under section 1 of an agreement between a single
supplier and a single customer to refuse to deal with another customer. The
legality of such an agreement was presumed: "[I]t [is] clear that the
decision of the seller to transfer his business from A to B is valid even
though B may have solicited the transfer and even though the seller and B
may have agreed before the seller terminates his dealings with A. 233
Rather, the court's concern was directed at determining what cir-
cumstances would cause a refusal to deal pursuant to a conspiracy
involving horizontal competitors to be per se illegal under Kor's and
related authorities.
The holding of Hawaiian Oke has been used as support for two
distinct and divergent propositions. The first of these, the rule that a refusal
to deal pursuant to joint action by horizontal competitors isper se illegal
under section 1 only when carried out with anticompetitive intent,234 need
not concern us here. The second stands at the heart of the present inquiry: a
227. 416 F.2d at 76.
228. Id. at 76-80.
229. Id. at 76.
230. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 79-80.
233. Id. at 78.
234. Representative decisions recognizing this principle include Feminist Women's Health
Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530,546-47 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W, 3283 (Oct.
30, 1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hatley v. American
Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977); E. A. McQuade'rours, Inc. v. Consolidated
Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); North
Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 465 F. Supp. 665, 672-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
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refusal to deal violates section 1 if its purpose or effect is anticompetitive.
The second proposition, of course, was not addressed in Hawaiian
Oke, yet the case has become its virtual cornerstone. Cartrade, citing
Hawaiian Oke for just this principle, has already been discussed. 235 The
principle was promptly appropriated for application in two-firm refusal
cases, as the following language from Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack
Daniel Distillery,236 a case decided by the Ninth Circuit in early 1972,
demonstrates:
The critical inquiry in such "refusal tb deal" cases is not whether there was a
refusal to deal, or whether a refusal to deal was carried out by agreement with
others, but rather whether the refusal to deal, manifested by a combination or -
conspiracy, is so anticompetitive, in purpose or effect, or both, as to be an
unreasonable restraint of trade. Hawaiian Oke, supra, at 77-78; Walker
Distributing Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1963).
This inquiry is primarily a factual one, and its resolution often requires
determination of motive or intent.237
This misapplication of the holding in Hawaiian Oke, standing on an
unwarranted extension of the court's boycott discussion into the setting of
two-firm vertical agreements, has yielded a mass of cases endorsing the rule
(usually in dicta) that a refusal to deal is illegal if actuated by
23
anticompetitive intent. 38Indeed, the cases have become so numerous that
the proposition has evolved into hornbook law. A recent decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shows both how deeply embedded
the proposition has become and the inevitable consequences of reliance
upon it.
Fount- Wip, Inc. v. Reddi- Wip, Inc. 239 arose out of a death struggle
between two Chicago whipped cream entrepreneurs. In the mid-1960s,
Chicago supported three dairies that produced whipping cream: Brookhill
235. See text accompanying notes 198-208 supra.
236. 454 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1972).
237. Id. at452. Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963), cited
by the court along with Hawaiian Oke, has not been relied upon in other refusal to deal ases approving
the "purpose or effect, or both" formula. In Walker a distributor of Lucky Lager beer alleged that the
manufacturer of the beer had terminated it as a distributor pursuant to a combination with competing
distributors because it was handling beers that competed with Lucky Lager. In holding that the alleged
conspiracy was not per se illegal, the court speculated that it might nonetheless be an unreasonable
restraint of trade because anticompetitive in "purpose or effect, or both." 323 F.2d at 7.
238. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954,961 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated
on other grounds by stipulation of the parties, 521 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1979); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 579 F.2d 126,129 n.4 (2d Cir.) (enbanc), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 340(1978); Quality Mercury, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466,470(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,433 U.S. 914(1977); Burdett Sound,
Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1975); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 120
(9th Cir. 1972); Air Freight Haulage Co. v. Ryd-Air, Inc., [1978-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) I 62,321, at
75,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Robinson v. Magover, 456 F. Supp. 1000, 1005-06 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Gerson-
Ogden, Inc. v. Avon Products, Inc., [1978-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,271, at 75,679 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Natrona Serv., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 435 F. Supp. 99, 108 (D. \Vyo. 1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1294
(10th Cir. 1979); V. & L. Cicione, Inc. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 643, 649 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Mogul v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (E.D. Pa. 1975),aff'dniem.,527F.2d
645 (3d Cir. 1976).
239. 568 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Farms, Super Whip Sales, and Instant-Whip. 240 Fount-Wip and Reddi-
Wip were competing producers of aerosol whipped cream topping.24' The
topping was marketed through franchised dairies, which in the Chicago
area were either Brookhill Farms or Super Whip Sales. 242 All the
production of Instant-Whip was used by its parent corporation, and it was
not available as a franchisee. 243 In 1964 Reddi-Wip acquired Super Whip
Sales; and in 1965 it acquired Brookhill. At the time, Brookhill was a
franchisee of Fount-Wip. 244 Brookhill terminated its franchise in early
1968 and thereafter refused to deal with Fount-Wip.243
Fount-Wip and a sister corporation sued Reddi-Wip, Brookhill and
others, alleging, among other things, that Brookhill's refusal to deal had
the effect (since Reddi-Wip also controlled Super Whip Sales and Instant-
Whip was not available as a franchisee) of excluding Fount-Wip from the
Chicago market.246 After a jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs, the district
court entered judgment for defendants notwithstanding the verdict and, in
247the alternative, granted defendants' motion for a new trial.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that plaintiffs' section I claim
raised factual issues which should not have been taken from the jury.248
The court first noted that a "refusal to deal which is anticompetitive in
purpose or effect, or both, constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman Act. 249 It then held that whether the Brookhill
termination was in fact a refusal to deal (as opposed to a mere failure in the
attempted negotiation of terms for a renewal of the franchise) and whether
the refusal was "a product of anticompetitive motive" were factual issues
which could only have been decided by the jury.250 Focusing on Reddi-
Wip's alter-ego, Lipsky, and the head of Fount-Wip, Lapin, the court
described the evidence of anticompetitive motive, and its significance, as
follows:
There was testimony that Lipsky had threatened to wipe out Lapin and that
Lipsky had also taken steps to drive Lapin out of the New York market area,
Moreover, evidence was abundant that personal enmity between the two men
was long standing. To be sure, Lipsky's anticompetitive purpose was
primarily founded in personal animosity. Fount-Wip and Reddi-Wip
apparently did not view each other as competitors, and only after Reddi-Wip
had acquired Brookhill did they become, even indirectly, trading partners.
240. Id. at 1298.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1298-300.
243. Id. at 1298.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1299.
246. Id. at 1300.
247. Id. at 1298.
248. Id. at 1301.
249. Id. at 1300.
250. Id.
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Nevertheless, Lapin and Lipsky, warring through their separate cor-
porations, chose to fight out their personal conflict on an economic
battlefield. If defendants did conspire to drive Lapin out of business, then a
combination in restraint of trade existed which fits within the plain words of
the statute.25" '
This reasoning conflicts sharply with the Sixth Circuit's analysis of
Ace Beer. In Ace Beer plaintiff alleged that defendants had conspired to
drive it out of business. 252 Yet, unlike the court in Fount- Wip, the court
confined its attention to the effect on competition produced by the refusal,
not upon the state of mind of the actors.25 The court in Fount- hp, on the
other hand, entirely ignored effect, holding instead that there is a violation
of section 1 when a single-supplier, single-customer refusal to deal is
undertaken with anticompetitive intent, regardless of whether an
unreasonable restraint of trade results. Hawaiian Oke obviously does not
support this conclusion, nor do any of the common-law cases upon which
section 1 was premised or any later refusal to deal cases decided prior to
Hawaiian Oke.254 The holding can be explained only as the inevitable
product of decisions like Cartrade and Alpha Distributing Co., 255 which
misappropriated the boycott analysis of Hawaiian Oke for use in a
nonboycott context.
Hawaiian Oke is not, however, the sole source of the fallacy that
anticompetitive intent alone is unlawful under section 1. As applied to
single-supplier, single-customer refusals to deal, the proposition also
springs from dicta in two Supreme Court opinions, United States v.
Columbia Steel Co. 256 and Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States.
257
In Columbia Steel the Court addressed the government's contention
that the elimination, by acquisition, of a customer for the product of a
competitor of the acquiring company was per se illegal under section1.25' The Court rejected the argument, holding that the competitive
effect of the vertical integration could not be presumed, but must in-
stead be evaluated for reasonableness by reference to the acquisition's
actual impact on the relevant market.259 In an opinion by Justice Reed,
251. Id. at 1301.
252. See text accompanying notes 187, 193 supra.
253. See text accompanying note 194 supra.
254. The holding is also at odds with the Supreme Court's recent decision in National Soe' of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978), in which the Court observed that under
either per se or rule of reason analysis "the inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on
competitive conditions." See also text accompanying note 288 infra.
255. See notes 198, 236 supra. See also Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 120 (9th Cir.
1972).
256. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
257. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
258. 334 U.S. at 520-21.
259. Id. at 521-23.
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the Court distinguished United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,260 the case
upon which the government had relied for its per se argument:
In the complaint [in Yellow Cab] the government charged that the defendants
had combined and conspired to effect the restraints in question with the intent
and purpose of monopolizing the cab business in certain cities, and on motion
to dismiss that allegation was accepted as true. Where a complaint charges
such an unreasonable restraint as the facts of the Yellow Cab case show, the
amount of interstate trade affected is immaterial in determining whether a
violation of the Sherman Act has been charged. A restraint may be
unreasonable either because a restraint otherwise reasonable is accompanied
with a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden restraint or because it falls
within the class of restraints that are illegal per se. For example, where a
complaint charges that the defendants have engaged in price fixing, or have
concertedly refused to deal with non-members of an association, or have
licensed a patented device on condition that unpatented materials be
employed in conjunction with the patented device, then the amount of
commerce involved is immaterial because such restraints are illegal per se.
Nothing in the Yellow Cab case supports the theory that all exclusive dealing
arrangements are illegal per se.26'
The Court cited no authority for the italicized language, and none
appears in Yellow Cab. The language has possible application to proof of
an attempt to monopolize,262 but the Court was not addressing a section 2
issue.263 The language is in fact groundless dictum, squarely conflicting
with the Court's holding in Chicago Board of Trade that intent alone is not
dispositive of the legality of a combination under section 1.264 And, of
course, it goes without saying that the rule conflicts with the common law
of contracts and conspiracies on which the Sherman Act stands. 265
Justice Reed's statement was repeated by Justice Clark in Times-
Picayune. In that case, the government challenged a New Orleans
newspaper's practice of linking the sale of advertising in morning and
evening newspapers. After concluding that the link did not constitute a
tying arrangement (which is per se unlawful under section 1), the Court
turned its attention to the legality of the practice "under the Sherman Act's
general prohibition on unreasonable restraints of trade., 266 It then
summarized the tests of legality under the rule of reason:
260. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
261. 334 U.S. at 522-23 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
262. The intent required to prove attempted monopolization is" 'specific intent'; an intent which
goes beyond the mere intent to do the act." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
432 (2d Cir. 1945). What is required is a "specific intent to destroy competition or build monopoly."
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953). See also Swift & Co, v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375,396 (1905); Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. Iluffalo Evening News, Inc.,
601 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1979).
263. See 334 U.S. at 519. The Court also observed that a restraint not unreasonable could be
unlawful if the actor had a specific intent to restrain trade unreasonably. ld. at 525,525 n.24, citing the
intent discussion in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948), a § 2 monopolization case,
264. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See text accompanying notes 7, 19 supra.
265. See text accompanying notes 77-158 supra.
266. 345 U.S. at 614.
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For purposes of §1, "[a] restraint may be unreasonable either because a
restraint otherwise reasonable is accompanied with a specific intent to
accomplish a forbidden restraint or because it falls within the class of
restraints that are illegal per se." United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495, 522 (1948). Since the requisite intent is inferred whenever unlawful
effects are found, United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105, 108 (1948);
United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913), and the rule of
International Salt is out of the way, the contracts may yet be banned by §1 if
unreasonable restraint was either their object or effect.267
The Court's confusion is unmistakable. It applied section 2 standards,
under which intent, whether specific or general,26 is a necessary element of
proof, to section 1, when intent has, at best, only evidentiary value, and
then only to the extent it assists the factfinder in evaluating the effects of a
restraint.
269
The statements in Columbia Steel and Times-Picayune have found
their way into later cases, usually as dicta.270 In at least one case,
however-albeit a case that was reversed on appeal-these two Supreme
Court cases formed the premise for liability. In Magnus Petroleum Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 27 1 Magnus, a jobber for Skelly Oil Company, alleged that
the provisions of his service station dealership agreements pertaining to the
conditions of terimiation violated, among other things, section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Specifically, Magnus alleged that he was foreclosed from
purchasing a business that competed with the three Skelly service stations
he ran by operation of certain provisions that made the termination of the
agreements conditional upon the satisfaction of particularly onerous
obligations. Magnus contended that these restrictions prevented him from
becoming a jobber for Sunray DX.272
267. Id.
268. Proof of monopolization requires only a general intent to do the acts that necessarily and
foreseeably result in monopolization. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105,108 (1948);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,432 (2d Cir. 1945). See also note 29 supra.
On the intent needed to prove attempted monopolization, see note 262 supra.
269. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690, 692
(1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,59 (1977); Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
270. See, e.g., Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum& Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20,32
n.47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 214 (1978) (citingAmerican Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
521 F.2d 1230, 1248 (3d Cir. 1975)); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230,
1248 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing Columbia Steeland imes-Picayune); Varney v. Coleman Co., 385 F. Supp.
1337, 1341 (D.N.H. 1974) (citing Columbia Steel); Scott Publishing Co. v. Columbia Basin Publishers,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 754, 769 (W.D. Wash. 1959) (citing Columbia Steel).
Without citing Columbia Steel or 7imes-Picayune, the Supreme Court, in an opinion byJustice
Burger, recently referred, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,438 U.S. 422,436 n.13 (1978),
to "the general rule that a civil violation can be established by proof ofeitheran unlawful purpose oran
anticompetitive effect." Cited as support for the proposition was United States v. Container Corp., 393
U.S. 333, 337 (1969), and id. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting), a price-fixing case in which
anticompetitive effect was presumed because price-fixing isperse unlawful under § 1. The case has no
language that would support Justice Burger's statement.
271. 446 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Wis. 1978), rev'd, 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.),cert. dented,48 U.S.L.W.
3253 (Oct. 16, 1979).
272. Id. at 879.
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A jury returned a verdict for Magnus. In its opinion denying Skelly's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the district court turned
aside Skelly's contention that no violation of section 1 could be found in
the absence of evidence of anticompetitive effect:
Turning first to Skelly's second argument, there are cases indicating that both
the object and the effect of a restraint must be considered in determining
whether a violation of§l has occurred. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1246-8 (3rd Cir. 1975); Twin City Sportservice, Inc.
v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 1975); Jewel Tea Co.
v. Local Unions, 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1960). However, it has also been held
that "contracts may ...be banned by §1 if unreasonable restraint was
either their object or effect." (emphasis supplied). Times-Picayune v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 614, 73 S.Ct. 872, 883, 97 L.Ed. 1277 (1953); accord,
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Coleman Oil Co., 470 F.2d 925,930-1 (1st Cir. 1972).
Applying the latter standard, a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act may be
found in the case at bar.
There was ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded
that the object of the financing arrangements was to restrain trade.273
The court held, therefore, that section 1 was violated since Skelly had an
"intent to restrain trade in the relevant market."
274
Magnus Petroleum represents the reductio ad absurdum of the twin
chains of authority, emanating from Hawaiian Oke and Columbia Steel,
that an intent to restrain trade, standing alone, violates section 1. Viewed
in this light, section 1 becomes a device by which treble damages can be
recovered simply upon proof of a state of mind. This marks a drastic
departure, destitute of justification, from the common law and from
Chicago Board of Trade.
Not all courts, when given the opportunity to embrace the "effect or
intent" dictum, have succumbed to these dubious authorities. Most
notably, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently addressed and
rejected the proposition that had been readily approved in Magnus
Petroleum. In Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries,
Inc.,275 plaintiff, Northwest Power Products, alleged that its dealership
agreement had been terminated as part of a combination between a
supplier and its new distributor that violated section 1.
Northwest, prior to termination, had approximately twenty percent
of the Dallas-Fort Worth market for the distribution and servicing of
power-actuated tools used in positioning fasteners for holding objects on
masonry, including powder-actuated tools manufactured by Omark.276
273. Id. at 880.
274. Id. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the holding of the district court, but it did so
without specific discussion of the court's conclusion that § I can be violated by an evil intent alone. The
court of appeals stated only that it disagreed that the object of the arrangements in question was to
restrain trade. 599 F.2d at 204. It also noted that the plaintiffs had failed to prove any substantial
adverse impact on a relevant market. Id.
275. 576 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1021 (1979).
276. Id. at 85.
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Omark became dissatisfied with Northwest and eventually ceased
supplying it.277 Simultaneously, it appointed a new distributor, Bosco,
which in turn hired away certain key employees of Northwest.
Northwest nonetheless continued in business, selling powder-actuated
tools of other manufacturers.279
Following termination, Northwest sued Omark and Bosco. It asserted
that Bosco and Omark had conspired to eliminate it as a competitor of
Bosco by informing Northwest's customers that, among other things, the
company would soon be bankrupt or out of business.280 The district court
granted summary judgment against Northwest, holding that it had not
stated a claim under section 1.28' By then Northwest's market share had
dropped to two percent and Bosco's had increased to eleven and one-half
percent.
282
Northwest appealed the grant of summary judgment, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed on the ground, inter alia, that an intent to eliminate a
competitor, unaccompanied by any evidence of anticompetitive effect, was
not actionable under Section 1. The court reasoned as follows:
To prove an antitrust violation under the rule of reason, Northwest must
show the defendants' conduct adversely affected competition. That showing
is essential, because "[a]n antitrust policy divorced from market con-
siderations would lack any objective benchmarks." Continental T. V., Inc.,
433 U.S. at 53 n.21, 97 S. Ct. at 2560. See Posner, The Rule of Reason andthe
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev.
1 (1977). An evil intent alone is insufficient to establish a violation under the
rule of reason, although proof of intent may help a court assess the market
impact of the defendants' conduct. See Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at
238, 38 S. Ct. 242.
The district court held that Northwest had shown only the substitution
of one distributor for another, and so had failed to produce facts which would
demonstrate anticompetitive effect upon the business of selling and servicing
PAT equipment in the North Texas region. On that reading of the evidence,
its legal conclusion was impeccably correct ...
. . . Northwest has failed to show anticompetitive effect and so cannot
establish an antitrust violation under the rule of reason. 8
This holding has in turn been followed in later cases decided by the Fifth
Circuit.
214
The Supreme Court's recent holdings in Continental T. V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc. 285 and National Society of Professional Engineers v.
277. Id. at 85-86.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 86.
281. Id. at 85.
282. Id. at 86.
283. Id. at 90-91.
284. See Daniels v. All Steel Equip., Inc., 590 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1979); H & B Equip. Co. v.
International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 1978).
285. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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United States286 also support the conclusion that anticompetitive intent
will not, standing alone, state a claim under section 1. After rejecting a rule
of per se illegality for vertical restraints in GTE Sylvania, the Court held
that the legality of such restraints depends upon their impact on the
market: "When anticompetitive effects are shown to result from particular
vertical restrictions they can be adequately policed under the rule of
reason .. . ."21 Similarly, in rejecting application of the rule of reason to
the price-fixing arrangement before it in National Society of Professional
Engineers, the Court observed that demonstration of anticompetitive
impact was crucial to proof of a section I violation:
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish
their illegality-they are "illegal per se"-in the second category are agree-
ments whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it
was imposed' In either event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judg-
ment about the competitive significance of the restraint .... 288
These recent statements by the Supreme Court re-affirm the Chicago
Board of Trade holding that intent has only evidentiary significance and is
not dispositive of the legality of a contract, conspiracy, or combination, 9
diametrically conflict with the Court's dicta in Columbia Steel and Times-
Picayune, and, in the setting of refusals to deal, add authority to the Sixth
Circuit's holding in Ace Beer that market impact is the measure of legality
for two-firm vertical conspiracies under section 1.290
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Proof of violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act requires, in the case
of monopolization, a showing of willful or intentional acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power or, in the case of attempted monopoliza-
tion, specific intent to monopolize. Proof of a violation of section 1, on the
other hand, stands or falls on a demonstration of anticompetitive effect.
291
286. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
287. 433 U.S. at 59.
288. 435 U.S. at 692.
289. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
290. The attention here given to those decisions stating or holding that joint action accompanied
by anticompetitive effect or intent will support a claim under § I should not be understood to mean that
other courts have not required proof of anticompetitive effect as a condition precedent to § I liability,
See, e.g., Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 389 (9th Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1280
(1979); Chow v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 457 F. Supp. 1303,1306-07 (ED.N.Y. 1978); Petroleum for
Contractors, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., [1978-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,151, at 75,081-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Bernard v. Curtis Circulation, [1978-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62.141, at 75,035-36 (9.D.N.Y.
1978); Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1976),
291. In monopolization cases, anticompetitive effect is a fail accompli. Legality does not turn
upon whether there is a restraint, but rather upon whether the restraint was acquired or has been
maintained wilfully. See notes 29, 268 supra. Proof of attempted monopolization requires a prediction
of whether such a wilful restraint will come to pass. See note 262 supra. In either situation,
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Just as a good intent will not justify conduct that unreasonably restrains
trade, so anticompetitive intent will not convert conduct falling short of an
unreasonable restraint of trade into unlawful action.
The conclusion that anticompetitive intent cannot by itself form the
basis for a finding of violation of section 1 is supported by the common law
as it existed at the time of enactment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Under the common law, the reasonableness of a contract or combination
in restraint of trade did not pivot on the state of mind of the parties.
Similarly, whether a conspiracy in restraint of trade was actionable did not
depend upon the presence of anticompetitive intent on the part of the
parties to the conspiracy. A conspiracy was actionable only if the object of
the conspiracy or the means for attaining the object were unlawful.
The authorities holding that a violation of section I may be proved by
evidence of anticompetitive effect or intent rest upon a misreading of
Hawaiian Oke or upon unfounded dicta in two Supreme Court decisions,
Columbia Steel and Times-Picayune.
Although the elimination of a competitor through an agreement with
a common supplier (as was alleged, for example, in Perryton Wholesale
Inc. v. Pioneer Distributing Co. ,292 and sought to be proven in Oreck Corp.
v. Whirlpool Corp.293) may violate section I because it results in a
reduction of intrabrand competition, it is the restraint that is the measure
of illegality, not the presence or absence of anticompetitive intent. Indeed,
"anficompetitive" intent was, at common law, a neutral factor. Lord
Halsbury, in describing the significance of intent nearly ninety years ago in
the Mogul Steamship case, made the following observation, which is still
valid today:
[I]n proportion as one withdraws trade that other people might get, you, to
that extent, injure a person's trade when you appropriate the trade to
yourself. If such an injury, and the motive of its infliction, is examined and
tested, upon principle, and can be truly asserted to be a malicious motive
within the meaning of the law that prohibits malicious injury to other people,
all competition must be malicious and consequently unlawful ....
If Lord Halsbury's view were rejected, virtually all business conduct
adversely affecting competitors would become illegal. Businesses act out of
self-interest, and the promotion of self-interest necessarily carries with it
an intent to prevail over trade rivals. This intent is inevitably an-
ticompetitive because the actor seeks to divert the business of his
competitors into his own hands. Under the cases approving intent alone as
anticompetitive impact is a foregone conclusion. The situation is significantly different in restraints
challenged under § 1. In evaluating the legality of these restraints, anticompetitive impact must be
independently investigated and substantiated. Once such an impact is established (by weighing all the
circumstances, including, when appropriate, the actors' purpose), proof of a violation is completeand
intent becomes irrelevant.
292. 353 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966).
293. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 340 (1978).
294. [1892] A.C. at 36-37.
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a ground for finding violation of section 1, however, any conduct taken to
further such self-interest which then causes injury to the business or
property of a competitor,295 exposes the actor to section 1 liability,
regardless of the impact of his conduct on trade in the relevant market.
This construction of section 1 would make competition itself unlawful, an
absurd result. Congress passed the Sherman Act to promote, not punish,
competition.
295. Under § 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15,26 (1976)), a person has standing to maintain
a treble damage action if he has been injured in his business orproperty by rcason of conduct unlawful
under the antitrust laws.
